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ABSTRACT 
 
Essays on Environmental, Energy and Land Economics in China 
 
Yiming He 
 
This dissertation consists of three essays involving environmental pollution, electricity 
consumption, and farmland leasing in China. These economic analyses are linked by their 
inclusion of institutional changes which have occurred in China over the past half-century. 
The first essay examines the effects of environmental pollution and institutional abatement 
targets on real average housing prices in China. The Spatial Difference-In-Difference 
model shows that the overall effect of 2006 SO2 institutional abatement targets is to 
increase real average housing prices across provinces. The changes in both emissions of 
sulfur dioxide and industrial wastewater discharges have negative impacts on the change of 
real average housing prices. 
Essay two considers one of the most important issues in electricity consumption 
research, namely, the electricity consumption function. This research demonstrates that 
metropolitan electricity consumption is a function of economic output and electricity 
consumption habits along with the electricity demand management reform.  
Finally, the third essay develops a theoretical model to identify optimal farmland 
contracts. Under complete information, a fixed-rent contract is the optimal institutional 
arrangement from land lessor‘s perspective. Conversely, a share contract is the best choice 
for land lessor under incomplete information. The empirical results show that the farmer 
who leases farmland to external individuals has a lower probability of choosing a fixed-rent 
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contract. However, the farmer who leases farmland to internal individuals is less likely to 
choose a share contract.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
This dissertation combines research on three essay topics involving institutional 
economic analyses within China. The first essay examines the impacts of province level 
pollution and institutional abatement targets for SO2 on housing prices throughout the 
country of China. The second one determines how economic output and electricity demand 
management reform affect metropolitan electricity consumption in Guangzhou, China. 
Finally, the third essay emphasizes on the effect of information structure on farmland 
contractual choice in Canton of China. 
The objective of the first essay in Chapter 2 is to examine the effects of pollution 
and institutional abatement targets on housing prices in China. Three econometric models 
are examined: Fixed Effects, Spatial Fixed Effects and Spatial Difference-In-Difference. So, 
I ask three questions: (1) How do water pollution discharges and air pollution emissions 
impact real average housing prices in China? (2) Do institutional abatement targets for air 
pollution increase real average housing prices? (3) How consistent and robust are the 
different econometric approaches in assessing the impacts from questions (1) and (2)?  
 To answer these questions, I provide a theoretical demand-supply framework and 
empirical evidence to show how environmental pollution and regulatory targets in SO2 
emission abatement affect real average housing prices on a province level. The theoretical 
framework reveals that environment pollution has a negative impact on real average 
housing prices, and the empirical results show that emission regulation targets have a 
positive impact on housing prices. The empirical results are consistent and robust across the 
three models. In terms of the empirical results, theoretical expectations for SO2 emissions 
and discharges of industrial wastewater are both confirmed in Fixed Effects Models and 
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Spatial Fixed Effects Models, which are consistent with theoretical implication above. 
Moreover, the empirical results from an institutional experiment of different regulatory 
targets by province demonstrate that the institutional abatement targets drive up real 
average housing prices in China.  
In Chapter 3, the purpose is to investigate the effect of economic output on 
electricity consumption. This effect is examined under electricity demand management 
reform by setting up a dynamic optimal control model in order to derive a basic electricity 
consumption function. So, I ask three questions: (1) What is the relationship between 
electricity consumption and economic output? (2) If economic output increases, will that 
cause more electricity usage? (3) How does reform of electricity demand management 
impact electricity consumption? 
To answer these questions, I set up a theoretical model showing that electricity 
consumption is a function of economic output and electricity consumption habits. Based on 
this model, I design an institutional experiment using the kink regression discontinuity 
approach to investigate the effect on electricity consumption from the 1985 electricity 
demand management reform that occurred in Guangzhou. The empirical results 
demonstrate three findings: (1) a unidirectional Granger causality running from economic 
output to electricity consumption; (2) previous electricity consumption habits have a ―path 
dependent‖ effect on current electricity consumption; and (3) given electricity demand 
management reform, economic output drives up the electricity consumption. 
The objective of the final essay in Chapter 4 is to examine the effect of information 
structure on the farmland contractual choice behavior. Based on this idea, I ask five 
questions: (1) What is the relationship between information structure and farmland 
contractual choice? (2) Under what kind of information environment would fixed-rent 
contract be preferred as the optimal leasing arrangement? (3) Under what kind of condition 
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would land lessor choose a share contract rather than a fixed-rent contract? (4) How does 
the information structure affect farmland contractual choice? (5) What methods can be used 
to examine the effect of information structure on farmland contractual choice? 
To answer the questions above, I first build a theoretical model to identify the optimal 
farmland contract. I show that under complete information, land lessor chooses fixed-rent 
contract as the optimal institutional arrangement. The share contract is the best choice for 
land lessor under incomplete information. Second, I test the theoretical hypothesis using a 
data set of farmland contracts in Canton, China. If an internal individual (inside their 
village) represents a tenant who is under complete information and an external individual 
(outside their village) represents a tenant who is under incomplete information, then the 
empirical results by Logit Model and Propensity Score Matching Model both show that the 
farmer who leases the farmland to tenants outside the village has a lower probability of 
choosing a fixed-rent contract compared to the farmer who leases to external tenants and is 
more likely to choose a share contract. In addition, the farmer with higher agricultural 
income ratio is more likely to choose a fixed-rent contract, while the farmer with lower 
agricultural income ratio is more likely to choose a share contract. The results support the 
theoretical model‘s hypothesis that information structure affects farmland contractual 
choice. 
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Chapter 2: The Impacts of Environmental Pollution and Institutional 
Abatement Targets on Housing Prices in China 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Across the world, housing assets are a critical source of wealth for many households 
and an important determinant of consumption within economies. This means that home 
values, and therefore housing prices, are important to both households and economic 
policymakers. Housing prices are affected by numerous factors (Rogers 2006; Cho et al. 
2009; Ahmed et al. 2010; Sanjuán et al. 2015). In recent literature, the relationships 
between influential factors and housing prices have been found to vary substantially across 
countries and regions (Bjørnland and Jacobsen 2010; Gupta et al. 2010; Teng et al. 2013; 
Lai et al. 2014; Lee and Song 2015). Econometric research indicates that the impact on 
housing prices frequently yields notably different results. For instance, Du et al. (2018) 
have found that energy consumption drives up real average housing price, while Sun and 
Tsang (2018) argue that regulation and monetary policy impact housing prices. So, the key 
question is: which factors influence housing prices most significantly? In terms of the 
general model on housing, the literature recently emphasizes assessing the housing policy 
effect on the housing markets (Aoki et al. 2004; Del Negro and Otrok 2007; Kajuth 2010; 
Bofinger et al. 2013).  
       On the other hand, the empirical research focuses on the applying the spatial 
econometric approach to housing markets (Anselin and Lozano-Gracia 2008). They find 
that spatial variations in house prices are considerable. It is demonstrated that regional 
house price spatial variations can indeed largely be explained by characteristics of the 
residential environment (Visser et al. 2008). In addition, Cho et al. (2009) show that the 
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value of proximity to greenways, parks, and water bodies increases over time, while the 
value of lot size and proximity to golf courses falls. Du et al. (2018) suggest that energy 
consumption has increased housing sales in China from 2004 to 2015, utilizing an optimal 
dynamic general equilibrium theoretical framework combined with a spatial economic 
model.  
Additionally, the research on the nexus between environmental regulation and 
housing market has been conducted (Kiel 2005; Kuethe and Keeney 2012; Currie et al. 
2015; Tian et al. 2017). For instance, Jim and Chen (2006) find that views of green spaces 
and proximity to water bodies raise housing prices. The outdoor environmental quality 
influences house-buyers‘ preferences and purchase decision (Jim and Chen 2007). Other 
scholars have observed consumer housing purchase behavior in China through choice 
experiment method (Wang and Li 2006). Wang et al. (2015) have found that the 
environmental characteristics have obvious positive impacts on housing prices of cottages 
and villas. Wu et al. (2015) have found sulfur dioxide emissions are negatively associated 
with average housing prices in China from 1993 to 2011. But they do not examine the 
effect of water pollution on housing prices. So, I will assess the effects of air pollution and 
water pollution on real average housing prices in China. 
In terms of the research on environmental regulation in China, Xu (2011) utilizes 
the goal of a 10% reduction of sulfur dioxide emissions in China's 11th Five-Year Plan 
(2006–2010). Based on Xu‘s (2011) study, Shi and Xu (2018) find that in more 
pollution-intensive industries, stricter environmental regulation reduces both the probability 
that a firm will export and the volume of exports.  
However, there has been limited attention in economic literature devoted to 
investigating the effects of institutional abatement targets and environment pollution on real 
average housing prices in developing countries. Moreover, there is no literature regarding 
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estimating the effects of air pollution and water pollution on housing prices. So, the 
objective of this essay is to examine the effects of both air pollution and water pollution 
integrating institutional abatement targets, based on different kinds of econometric models, 
such as Fixed Effects Model, Spatial Fixed Effects Model, and Spatial 
Difference-In-Difference model. In this essay, I focus on the impacts of environmental 
pollution and institutional abatement targets on housing values in the theoretical model, 
using panel data in China. I ask the following questions: (1) How do water pollution 
discharges and air pollution emissions impact real average housing prices across provinces 
in China?(2) Do institutional abatement targets for air pollution increase real average 
housing prices? (3) How consistent and robust are different econometric approaches in 
assessing the impacts from questions (1) and (2)?  
Furthermore, most of literature evaluating the effect of pollution on housing prices 
mainly uses hedonic model, and the current studies do not consider the spatial effects. But 
in this essay, the impacts of institutional abatement targets and environmental pollution on 
real average housing prices in China will be examined by a demand and supply framework 
integrating spatial effects. Combining with this framework, I introduce an econometric 
modeling strategy to derive empirical implication regarding the relationship among real 
average housing prices, pollution, and emission regulation targets. In order to test the 
implication, I utilize Fixed Effects and Spatial Fixed Effects Models, combining with 
institutional experiment to analyze the impacts of the environmental pollution and 
institutional abatement targets on real average housing price in China. Province level data 
are used from 1998 to 2015. Hence, this essay contributes to the existing literature by 
examining the effects of institutional abatement targets and environment pollution on the 
real average housing prices in China. So, my contributions are following: (1) providing a 
new econometrical framework on the effects of environmental pollution and institutional 
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abatement targets on real average housing prices, (2) designing an institutional experiment 
integrated spatial factors to access the impact of institutional abatement targets on real 
average housing prices, and (3) distinguishing and examining both water and air pollution 
impacts on real average housing prices. 
This introduction section provides a brief overview of prior research analyzing the 
housing prices. These previous studies cover various sample periods and geographical 
regions, and employ somewhat different theoretic models and empirical methodologies. 
The structure of sections 2.2 and 2.3 covers theory development and subsequent methods 
following the pathways shown in Figure 2.1. In section 2.2, I outline the framework 
applying the econometric model of demand and supply with the environmental variable in 
the determination of the real average housing prices. In Section 2.3, I present the data 
utilized in the analysis. The impacts on real average housing prices are examined at the end 
of this section. Section 2.4 presents conclusions and further discussion.  
 
2.2 Theoretic Framework and Empirical Models 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. 1: Structural Flow Chart of the Theory and Econometric Methods Utilized in Chapter 2 
Implications of Pollution and Emission Regulation Impacts on Housing Prices  
Extension: Spatial Fixed Effects Regression 
Further Discussion: Institutional Experiment with Spatial Difference-In-Difference 
Fixed Effects Regression 
Demand and Supply of Econometric Framework 
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Following the theoretical framework of Chow and Niu (2015), I utilize a 
multiplicative equations model based on the demand and supply of Chinese housing 
markets. I let i denote the province and t the time-period. The multiplicative inverse 
demand and supply equations can be written as: 
Multiplicative Inverse Demand:  
        
     
                
         
       
     
 
        
Multiplicative Inverse Supply: 
         
     
         
     
 
         
where     denotes housing space per capita and        denotes real average 
housing prices by province and year.    
  and    
  are error terms.  
After taking the natural log of both sides for (2.1) and (2.2), I transfer multiplicative 
inverse demand function and supply function into linear inverse demand function and 
supply function as below: 
Linear Inverse Demand: 
                 
                
                    
             
Linear Inverse Supply:  
                 
             
               
In this research, I assume              
                
  𝑟               
    𝑟   
as a two-dimensional vector that contains the potential damage for human exposure to 
pollution–air and water (Gupta et al. 2008; Greenstone and Hanna 2014), which indicates 
the types of environmental pollution. As we know, a less desirable environment and poor 
quality of life attributes decrease the housing price per square meter (Visser et al. 2008; Wu 
et al. 2015). The other variables     denotes real disposable income per capita and 
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     denotes the real average costs for real estate construction (Zahirovich-Herbert and 
Gibler 2014). As the extent of urbanization impacts demand for housing (Wang et al. 2017), 
     denotes urbanization. Actually, rural migrants could obtain the urban Hukou 
(permanent urban resident license) through purchasing housing in urban area, so that rural 
migrants can acquire the social welfare including education and medical services in that 
area. So, in order to obtain relatively higher quality social services in urban area, rural 
migrants purchase housing and own a limited period (70 years) set of property rights to 
housing.  
Both demand and supply equations are assumed to be approximated by linear 
relationships and in equations (2.3) and (2.4), the parameters a, b, h, m, d, j, f and g are 
positive. Using these assumptions, the equilibrium real average housing prices can be 
solved as:  
        
  
     
   
 
  
   
             
  
  
   
      
  
   
      
 
  
   
        
    
      
 
   
                  
                                       
where    
     
   
,    
  
   
,    
  
   
,    
  
   
,    
  
   
, and      
    
      
 
   
 
In order to estimate the effect of environmental pollution in equation (2.5) on 
housing prices and capture the fixed effects on province and time, I extend equation (2.5) 
and get: 
        
                         
                           
            
where              .    captures all unobserved, time-constant factors that affect 
      , which is individual fixed effect. The year effect,   , is also treated as a parameter 
to be estimated. εit is the perturbation term varying with the province and time. 
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   So, from equation (2.6), the effect mechanism of variable of interest 
(             
 ) on equilibrium real average housing prices (        
 ) is derived: 
         
 
              
  
       
 
      
 
            
 
           
 
 
       
 
            
 
           
 
      
     
  
   
      
The theoretical implication related to the equilibrium real average housing prices stems 
from the result shown above: 
Implication The change of Environmental pollution has negative impact on the change of 
equilibrium real average housing prices. 
According to the First Law of Geography, everything is related to everything else, 
but near things are more related than distant things (Tobler 1979). Based on this, housing 
prices will be spatially autocorrelated if there is relative locational dependency between 
housing prices, and location characteristics are important determinants of housing prices 
(Osland 2010). So, if I measure the spatial spillover effect from housing prices, the equation 
(2.6) can be extended into the Spatial Fixed Effects Model. In general, the basic spatial 
econometrics model that has been labeled SAR (Spatial Autoregression Model) is 
popularized by a great deal of the literature on statistical testing of alternative model 
specifications (LeSage 2014). Based on (2.6), the Spatial Fixed Effects Model can be 
expressed as: 
        
                         
                           
 𝜌𝑤                     
where 𝜌𝑤                 ,     is the residual for (2.7) and w′iis the ith row of the 
spatial weight matrix 𝑊  [
𝑤  ⋯ 𝑤 𝑛
⋮ ⋮
𝑤𝑛 ⋯ 𝑤𝑛𝑛
]. The coefficient of spatial autoregressive 𝜌≠0 
is an unknown parameter which specifies the strength of correlation between co-located 
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provinces. Error term     represents unobservable factors excluding spatial spillover 
effects. w′i  RAHPt  ∑ w′ij  RAHPjt
n
j= , wij represents the (i, j) element of the spatial 
weight matrix W; ρw′i  RAHPt is the spatial lag item representing spatial autocorrelation. 
In terms of W, if province i and province j have a common border, then 𝑤    , otherwise 
𝑤    . And the diagonal elements are 0, that is,𝑤   ⋯  𝑤𝑛𝑛   , which means that 
the distance between the same province is 0.  
Furthermore, as robustness test, in terms of the effect of institutional abatement targets 
on real average housing prices, the institutional abatement targets in province i and year t 
(    ), such as central government setting an abatement targets to reduce national emission 
by 10% on average, encourage the local governments to make efforts to regulate emission. 
Following Chay and Greenstone (2005), Wu et al. (2015) and Shi and Xu (2018), I specify 
the estimation of effect of institutional abatement targets on equilibrium real average 
housing prices altered from (2.7) as below (let           and          ): 
        
                          
    𝑟                 
  𝑟         
                   𝜌𝑤
 
             
       𝑟 𝑣  𝑐       𝑚                  
    𝑟                
  𝑟
                
  𝑟                                     
 𝜌𝑤                      
where       𝑟 𝑣  𝑐     𝑚  ,  𝑟 𝑣  𝑐   is a group dummy variable equal to 0 for 
the province in which sulfur dioxide reduction target is below 10% and 1 for the province 
in which sulfur dioxide reduction target is at or above 10%, and   𝑚   is a stage dummy 
variable equal to 0 for 2001-2005 and 1 for 2006-2010. And    𝑟 𝑣  𝑐       𝑚   
               
  𝑟                         .     is the residual for (2.8). 
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2.3 Empirical Analyses 
 
2.3.1 Background and Data 
Actually, China‘s residential real estate sector plays a substantial role in the 
economy and has been a key driver of the nation‘s economic growth (Yao et al. 2014).  
But there is a great deal of research which has explored the existence of housing price 
bubble problems inside mainland China (Shih et al. 2014; Bian and Gete 2015; Du and 
Peiser 2014; Du and Zhang 2015; Feng and Wu 2015; Huang et al. 2015; Ng 2015; Wen 
and Tao 2015; Wu et al. 2015).  
On the other hand, in terms of regulations for air emissions in China, the Eleventh 
Five-Year Plan (2006-2010) was implemented by the China State Council, which only 
regards the regulation of sulfur dioxide emission but does not refer to water pollution 
problem (Xu 2011). In order to achieve this regulation goal, the Chinese central 
government set a national sulfur dioxide reduction target of 10% at the provincial level (Shi 
and Xu 2018).  
In order to test the relationship between pollution, air regulation, and housing prices in 
China, I conduct an empirical analysis at the province level. Annual data from 1998 to 2015 
were extracted from the China statistical yearbook from 1999 to 2016 and Economy 
Prediction System (EPS) database. However, I exclude the data from Tibet province, 
because of missing data. Hence, there are 30 provinces in the sample. According to 
implication in theoretic section, I follow the measurement for housing prices in China from 
Feng and Lu (2013) and Huang et al.(2015), so I let the dependent variable be annual real 
average housing prices (2015 as the base year).  Tables 2.1 and 2.2 present the variables, 
their respective definitions, and summary statistics.  
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Table 2. 1: Variable Definitions 
Variable Abbreviation Definition 
Real Average 
Housing Prices 
lnRAHP 
natural logarithmic of (Average Housing 
Prices*(CPI2015 /CPIt)) 
 
Water Pollution 
Discharges 
lnWW  
natural logarithmic of (Amount of Discharge for 
Industrial Wastewater/Total Population) 
 
Air Pollution 
Emissions 
 
 
lnSO2 
natural logarithmic of (Sulfur Dioxide 
Emission/Total Population) 
Real Estate 
Construction Cost 
lnBC 
natural logarithmic of (Cost of Real Estate 
Construction *CPI2015/CPIt) 
Real Income lnI 
natural logarithmic of (Disposable Income 
*(CPI2015 /CPIt)/Total Population) 
Urbanization lnUR 
natural logarithmic of (100*Urban Population/Total 
Population) 
 
Table 2. 2: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable 
lnRAHP lnWW lnSO2 lnBC lnI lnUR 
 
Mean 7.9865 2.6666 5.0255 7.3311 9.7806 3.7602  
Min 6.6172 1.1793 3.2244   6.4447 7.7850 2.6418  
Max 10.0271 4.1188 6.4688 8.6344 11.5895   4.4953  
Standard Deviation 0.6461 0.5140 0.6296 0.4708 0.8582 0.3670  
Observations 540 540 540 540 540 540  
 
Figure A1 in Appendix A1shows that the time trend of natural log of real average 
housing prices of China in the sample provinces from 1998 to 2015. It demonstrates that the 
natural log of real average housing prices in China among the sample provinces have an 
increasing trend, especially for Beijing and Yunnan. 
According to Liu et al. (2018), I utilize two environmental pollution indicators: (1) 
natural logarithmic of discharges of industrial wastewater per capita (lnWW), and (2) 
natural logarithmic of the annual quantities of sulfur dioxide emissions per capita (lnSO2). 
On one hand, the total population in each province is different. On the other hand, 
purchasing a house is the individual‘s own decision, so I measure pollution per person to 
precisely reflect how much pollutant for each individual has to suffer within a province, 
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which will affect the individual‘s consumption decision and the real average housing prices 
that the consumer is willing to pay. Meanwhile, pollutant per capita is consistent with other 
covariates such as real income per capita and urbanization.  
Figure A2 in Appendix A2 and Figure A3 in Appendix A3 show the time trend of 
natural log of discharges of industrial wastewater per capita of China and the time trend of 
natural log of sulfur dioxide emissions per capita of China in the sample provinces from 
1998 to 2015, respectively. Figure A2 demonstrates that lnWW decreases after the peak in 
most of provinces, but increase still occurs in some provinces, such as Qinhai and 
Shandong. Figure A3 illustrates that lnSO2 decreases after the peak in most of provinces, 
except for Xinjiang and Yunnan. 
As shown in Table 2.3, provincial governments set different sulfur dioxide reduction 
targets. Because according to the bargaining power based on the previous provincial sulfur 
dioxide emissions, each provincial government negotiated with the central government on 
the specific sulfur dioxide reduction burden. The emission regulation contracts for the 
provincial pollution reduction targets were signed by the provincial vice presidents (Xu 
2011). Table 2.3 demonstrates the sulfur dioxide reduction targets for all provinces in 
China from 2006 to 2010. Therefore, institutional abatement targets denoting the Eleventh 
Five-Year Plan for sulfur dioxide emission regulation, are represented by a dummy variable 
coded as one each year from 2006 to 2010. 
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Table 2. 3: Sulfur Dioxide Emission Reduction Targets in China (unit: 10,000 tons) 
Province SO2 emissions in 2005 
SO2 emission targets in 2010  
Reduction Percentage (%) 
Total 
In which: Electricity 
sector 
Beijing 19.1 15.2 5 20.4 
Tianjin 26.5 24 13.1 9.4 
Hebei 149.6 127.1 48.1 15 
Shanxi 151.6 130.4 59.3 14 
Neimenggu 145.6 140 68.7 3.8 
Liaoning 119.7 105.3 37.2 12 
Jilin 38.2 36.4 18.2 4.7 
Heilongjiang 50.8 49.8 33.3 2 
Shanghai 51.3 38 13.4 25.9 
Jiangsu 137.3 112.6 55 18 
Zhejiang 86 73.1 41.9 15 
Anhui 57.1 54.8 35.7 4 
Fujian 46.1 42.4 17.3 8 
Jiangxi 61.3 57 19.9 7 
Shandong 200.3 160.2 75.7 20 
Henan 162.5 139.7 73.8 14 
Hubei 71.7 66.1 31 7.8 
Hunan 91.9 83.6 19.6 9 
Guangdong 129.4 110 55.4 15 
Guangxi 102.3 92.2 21 9.9 
Hainan 2.2 2.2 1.6 0 
Chongqing 83.7 73.7 17.6 11.9 
Sichuan 129.9 114.4 39.5 11.9 
Guizhou 135.8 115.4 35.8 15 
Yunan 52.2 50.1 25.3 4 
Shaanxi 92.2 81.1 31.2 12 
Gansu 56.3 56.3 19 0 
Qinghai 12.4 12.4 6.2 0 
Ningxia 34.3 31.1 16.2 9.3 
Xinjiang 51.9 51.9 16.6 0 
Source: ―Reply to Pollution Control Plan During the Eleventh Five-Year Plan,‖ issued by the China 
State Council in 2006. 
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Here, in order to evaluate the impact of institutional abatement targets on real average 
housing prices in China, I design an institutional experiment five years before and five 
years after 2006 between the treated that is setting sulfur dioxide reduction target at or 
above 10% and the controlled that is setting sulfur dioxide reduction target below 10% 
(details in Table 2.3). 
 
 
Figure 2. 2: Map of Treated Group and Controlled Group in China at 2006 
 
In Figure 2.2, the treated Group involves Beijing, Hebei, Shanxi, Liaoning, Shanghai, 
Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Shandong, Henan, Guangdong, Chongqing, Sichuan, Guizhou, Shaanxi, 
Ningxia. And the controlled includes Tianjin, Neimenggu, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Anhui, 
Fujian, Jiangxi, Hubei, Hunan, Guangxi, Hainan, Yunnan, Gansu, Qinghai, Xinjiang. 
2.3.2 Empirical Results 
The key to causal inference is control for observed confounding factors. If important 
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confounders are unobserved, I might try to get the causal effects using Fixed Effects 
Models involving two-way Fixed Effects Models, Spatial Fixed Effects Models and Spatial 
Difference-In-Difference Model. This essay considers a variation on the control theme: 
strategies that use data with a time or cohort dimension to control for unobserved but fixed 
omitted variables (Angrist and Pischke 2008). 
 (1) Regression Results  
Here, I proceed to estimate the external effect of sulfur dioxide emission for equation 
(2.6), following empirical strategy of Chen et al. (2018). The regression results for 
individual Fixed Effects Models (FE) are reported in Table 2.4. According to Hausman test, 
the p-value of accept the null hypothesis of random effects is 0.1839, so I decide to utilize 
Fixed Effects Models. Since the variance inflation factor is 3, which is less than 10 so 
means that multicollinearity is not a problem for estimation (Wooldridge 2012). In, Table 
A1, the panel unit root test shows that the variables involving lnRAHP, lnWW, lnSO2, lnUR, 
lnBC and lnI are stationary (Appendix A4), so I can continue to run the Fixed Effects 
Models, Spatial Fixed Effects Models, and Spatial Difference-In-Difference Regression. 
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Table 2. 4: Results of Fixed Effects Models (Dependent Variable: lnRAHP) 
Variable  FE (P) FE (T) FE (PT) 
lnWW -0.0439* 0.0024 0.0027 
 (0.0255) (0.0232) (0.0235) 
lnSO2 -0.1412 *** -0.1396 *** -0.1036 *** 
 (0.0239) (0.0228) (0.0245) 
lnBC 0.3152 *** 0.2719 *** 0.2619 *** 
 (0.0455) (0.0439) (0.0427) 
lnI 0.4967 *** 0.1924 *** -0.0052 
 (.0277) (0.0412) (0.0475) 
lnUR 0.1439 *** 0.0917 *** 0.0483 
 (0.0274) (0.0273) (0.0267) 
Constant 1.1018 *** 4.1296 ** 5.9055 *** 
 (0.1629) (0.3603) (0.4058) 
 
Fixed Effects 
Province 
Year 
 
 
YES 
NO 
 
 
NO 
YES 
 
 
YES 
YES 
 
Adj-R
2
 
 
0.9091 
 
0.8573 
 
0.7406   
N 540 540 540 
Notes: 1) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1;2) Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 
Table 2.4 shows that model FE (P) has statistically significant negative coefficient for 
lnWW, which means that lnWW variable has a statistically significant negative impact on 
lnRAHP. This result confirms the theoretical implication that the change of environmental 
pollution lowers the change of real average housing prices. Specifically, if the discharge 
level of industrial wastewater increases by 1 %, the real average housing prices drop by 
0.0439% (162.42 Yuan RMB per square meter or 23.88 U.S Dollar per square meter). 
The significance of lnWW conflicts with the empirical results of Jim and Chen 
(2006). They demonstrate that environmental pollution does not influence housing 
willingness-to-pay, implying a tolerance of this chronic environmental nuisance in the 
urbanized metropolitan area of China. 
 In terms of sulfur dioxide emissions, the consistently negative, statistically 
significant coefficients for the variable lnSO2 are reported in FE (P), FE (T) and FE (PT). 
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So, increases in the sulfur dioxide emissions results in decreases in the real average housing 
prices in China. This result confirms the theoretical implication and is consistent with the 
findings by Yusuf and Resosudarmo (2009) about the impact of air pollution on housing 
prices. They argue that, in the cases of total hydro carbon and sulfur dioxide, pollutants 
have a negative association with housing prices at 5% level of significance. 
Therefore, I can conclude that the impact of sulfur dioxide emissions is greater than 
the impact of discharges of industrial wastewater, because the absolute value of coefficient 
of lnSO2 is much greater than the absolute value of coefficient of lnWW. Specifically, if the 
emission level of sulfur dioxide increases by 1%, then the real average housing prices drop 
by 0.1412% (522.40 Yuan RMB per square meter or 76.82 U.S Dollar per square meter) in 
FE (P), 0.1396% (516.48 Yuan RMB per square meter or 75.95 U.S Dollar per square 
meter) in FE (T) and 0.1036% (383.29 Yuan RMB per square meter or 56.36 U.S Dollar 
per square meter) in FE (PT). However, given an 1 % increase in discharges of industrial 
wastewater, the real average housing prices decline by 0.0439% (162.42 Yuan RMB per 
square meter or 23.88 U.S Dollar per square meter). It means that the impact of sulfur 
dioxide emissions is different from the impact of discharges of industrial wastewater.  
Table 2.4 also reports the results with the lnBC, lnI and lnUR as the control 
variables. In terms of all models in Table 2.4, the coefficients of the lnBC , lnI and lnUR are 
consistently positive and statistically significant in FE (P) and FE (T). It means that the 
changes of real cost of real estate construction, real disposable income per capita and 
urbanization also drive up the change of real average housing prices in China.  
(2) FE Extension from Spatial Fixed Effects Regression 
      In order to investigate the spillover effect of housing prices between neighbor 
provinces, I utilize Table 2.5 to test the equation (2.7). Table 2.5 illustrates that the 
empirical results of the Spatial Fixed Effects (SFE) regression are consistent with the 
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results from Table 2.4.  
 
Table 2. 5: Results of Spatial Fixed Effects Models (Dependent Variable: lnRAHP) 
Variable  SFE (P)      SFE (T)       SFE (PT) 
lnWW -0.0233 -0.0661*** -0.0004 
 (0.0206) (0.0184) (0.0216) 
lnSO2 -0.0648*** -0.0996 *** -0.0846 *** 
 (0.0200) (0.0152) (0.0228) 
lnBC 0.2198 *** 0.5589 *** 0.2395 *** 
 (0.0372) (0.0448) (0.0395) 
lnI 0.2095 *** 0.3709 *** 0.0253 *** 
 (0.0299) (0.0303) (0.0441) 
lnUR 0.0585** 0.1390 *** 0.0318 
 (0.0228) (0.0352) (0.0247) 
Spatial       0.5111 *** 0.1490*** 0.2824*** 
rho (0.0354) (0.0393) (0.0537) 
 
Fixed Effects 
Province 
Year 
 
 
YES 
NO 
 
 
NO 
YES 
 
 
YES 
YES 
 
Adj-R
2
 
0.8720 0.9093 0.8494 
N 540 540 540 
Note: 1) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; 2) Standard errors are presented below in parentheses. 
 
Table 2.5 illustrates that the natural log of discharges of industrial wastewater are 
negatively associated with the natural log of real average housing prices in SFE (T). It 
means that lnWW negatively impacts lnRAHP and confirms the theoretical implication 
above. Moreover, the coefficients of lnSO2 are significant and negative in each model-SFE 
(P), SFE (T) and SFE (PT). The effect of lnSO2 on lnRAHP is negative, which supports the 
implication from the theoretical model. Comparing with the results from Table 2.4, I find 
that the impact of lnSO2 is also greater than the impact of lnWW, which is consistent with 
the findings without spatial spillover effects. Compare coefficient size with non-spatial 
model–it seems the bias from not including spatial dependence is a more negative impact of 
lnWW on lnRAHP but is a less negative impact of lnSO2. Specifically, if the emission level 
of sulfur dioxide increases by 1 %, then the real average housing prices drop by 0.0648% 
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(239.74 Yuan RMB per square meter or 35.25 U.S Dollar per square meter) in SFE (P), 
0.0996% (368.49 Yuan RMB per square meter or 54.19 U.S Dollar per square meter) in 
SFE (T) and 0.0846% (312.99 Yuan RMB per square meter or 46.02 U.S Dollar per square 
meter) in SFE (PT). And if the discharge level of industrial wastewater increases by 1 %, 
the real average housing prices drop by 0.0661% (244.55 Yuan RMB per square meter or 
35.96 U.S Dollar per square meter) in SFE (T). Furthermore, I need to estimate the effect of 
institutional abatement targets on real average housing prices. 
 (3) Further Discussion: Evaluation of Emission Regulation using SDID  
The fixed effects strategy above requires panel data of repeated observations on the 
same individuals (or time). However, the institutional abatement targets vary only at a 
group level. The source of omitted-variable bias when evaluating these institutional targets 
must therefore be unobserved variables at the province and year level. To conduct the 
robustness check, group-level omitted variables can be captured by group-level fixed 
effects, so I design a sulfur dioxide emission regulation institutional experiment occurred at 
2006 across nation to investigate the causal effect of institutional abatement targets on real 
average housing prices.  
Again, in order to deal with the spillover issue, I change equation (2.7) by introducing 
the institutional abatement targets into the Spatial Difference-In-Difference (SDID) Model 
(Dubé et al. 2014; Heckert 2015; Dubé et al. 2017) in equation (2.8), which combines the 
Spatial Fixed Effects Model and Difference-In-Difference Method.  
According to the experimental design of sulfur dioxide emission regulation 
institutional targets from Shi and Xu (2018), I examine the effect of sulfur dioxide emission 
regulation institutional targets since 2006 on real average housing prices in China, so I 
design an institutional experiment using SDID.  
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A similar experiment (effect of sulfur emission regulation on export) has been 
conducted using Difference-In-Difference-In-Difference (Shi and Xu 2018; Cai et al. 2016). 
In order to investigate the causal effect of institutional abatement targets between neighbor 
provinces, I utilize the dataset from 2001 to 2010, which includes observations prior to and 
after the 2006 the Eleventh Five-Year Plan referring to the Central Government Target of 
sulfur dioxide reduction. Table 2.6 illustrates that the empirical results of the Spatial 
Difference-In-Difference regression that is corresponding to (2.8). 
 
Table 2. 6: Results of Spatial Difference-In-Difference (Dependent Variable: lnRAHP) 
Variable Coefficient Standard errors 
PL 
lnWW  
0.8500*** 
-0.0652** 
0.1634 
0.0313 
lnSO2 -0.0691** 0.0298 
PL*lnSO2 -0.1744*** 0.0306 
lnBC 0.2181*** 0.0506 
lnI 0.2563*** 0.0421 
lnUR 0.0997*** 0.0320 
Spatial rho 0.4351*** 0.0538 
Province 
Year 
0.1727** 
0.0489** 
0.0713 
0.0227 
Constant 0.4758* 0.2750 
Adj-R
2
 0.8337  
Observations 300  
Note: 1) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
       
As further extension, I show the estimates of SDID in Table 2.6. The change of PL 
from 0 to 1 is significantly positive (                                      
                                                      
           ), which measures the differential between the treated provinces and the 
controlled provinces during the Eleventh Five-Year Plan when mean of lnSO2 of the treated 
is 5.162422. This empirical result illustrates that institutional abatement targets for sulfur 
dioxide emission reduction are positively associated with the natural log of real average 
housing prices in China. It shows that for those provinces whose SO2 emission reduction 
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institutional targets were set at 10% or above starting after 2006 (thus, PL changes from 0 
to 1), the real average housing prices within those provinces increased on a one-time basis 
by 1.1135% (4119.64 Yuan RMB per square meter or 605.83 U.S Dollar per square meter). 
Thus, these results are interpreted to mean that during the Eleventh Five-Year Plan, 
institutional abatement reduction targets for SO2 were effective in reducing emissions such 
that these emission reductions were incorporated into increased natural log of real average 
housing prices due to environmental improvements. As a result, the institutional abatement 
targets of the treated provinces increase the natural log of real average housing prices.  
Similarly, the total effects of lnSO2 are significantly negative both for prior to the 
treatment (-0.0691) and after the treatment (-0.2435=-0.0691-0.1744), the coefficient of 
lnWW is also significantly negative (-0.0652), and the coefficients of lnBC, lnI and lnUR 
are significantly positive. So, these empirical results are consistent with the results from 
Table 2.5 and Table 2.6. 
 
2.4 Conclusions  
 
This essay provides a framework to conduct empirical research demonstrating how 
environmental pollution (water and air) along with institutional targets for reductions in air 
emissions affects real average housing prices in China. This framework reveals that the 
changes of both types of environment pollution have negative impacts on the change of real 
average housing prices. In terms of the empirical results, theoretical expectations for sulfur 
dioxide emissions and discharges of industrial wastewater are confirmed by both Fixed 
Effects Models and Spatial Fixed Effects Models. Moreover, the empirical results from 
institutional experiment demonstrate that emission reduction targets of 10% or larger result 
in higher real average housing prices across provinces during the Eleventh Five-Year Plan 
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in China. Furthermore, the impact of sulfur dioxide emissions is greater than the impact of 
discharges of industrial wastewater on real average housing prices. 
Environmental pollution represents a typical negative externality problem related to 
market failure (Bajari et al. 2012). From the perspective of the Chinese inter-province 
housing market, discharges of industrial wastewater and sulfur dioxide emissions are 
relevant market failures. The negative impact of these emissions on real average housing 
prices confirms numerous previous studies of air pollution emission impacting housing 
prices. As noted above, abatement targets about declining emissions for SO2 since 2006 
have increased real average housing prices. Lo et al. (2017) find that environmental 
enforcement in the Environmental Protection Bureau showed steady improvement between 
2000 and 2013. They observe that a ―widely publicized environmental quality 
administrative leadership responsibility system since 2000 to enhance accountability may 
account for the positive development of stronger local government support for pollution 
control‖. In addition, central supervision significantly reduces industrial emissions (Zhang 
et al 2018). 
Examining the empirical results from both the Fixed Effects and Spatial Fixed 
Effects Models, a conclusion can be reached that the impact of air pollution on real average 
housing prices is greater than the impact of water pollution on real average housing prices 
based on the absolute value of coefficient for air pollution versus water pollution. 
Furthermore, empirical results of Spatial Difference-In-Difference Model tell me that the 
absolute value of coefficient of institutional abatement targets is much greater than the 
absolute value of coefficient of air pollution. It means that even though air pollution 
reduces the real average housing prices, but institutional abatement targets for air pollution 
drive up the real average housing prices. In a word, the impacts of environmental policies 
on housing market are significant. In developing countries like China, governments are 
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investing large amounts of resources to reduce the increasingly severe air pollution. While 
such investment has many benefits, my study shows that it can also bring extra impacts to 
housing market. Policymakers therefore need to take the difference of strength of impacts 
of different environmental policies into account in future policymaking. 
Finally, this study has limitations that include: (1) the theoretical model assumes 
linearity and equilibrium, (2) the specification of econometric model does not consider 
macroeconomic factors such as interest rates and educational expenditure, (3) the use of 
real average housing prices without site specific information, thereby assuming that 
housing attributes remain constant over time, (4) only air pollution and water pollution are 
assessed as environmental pollutants – other environmental aspects potentially impacting 
housing prices, such as noise and green space, are not included in our models, and (5) 
important uncertainties within the housing market concerning central government 
regulations, real estate market structures, and home ownership (Ho and Kwong 2002) are 
not included in the empirical models. (6) Based on the framework, I do not investigate the 
other impacts from pollution on society that are not reflected in real average housing prices 
and thus not in my model. For instance, the impact of pollution on health is other serious 
problem in China. So, I will extend the empirical research to examine the effect of pollution 
on medical expenditure or Mortality. 
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Chapter 3: Metropolitan Electricity Consumption Function: 
The Institutional Experimental Evidence from Guangzhou, China 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
One of the surprising discoveries in electricity economics over the past twenty years 
has been the relationship between electricity consumption and economic output. In the 
literature, the evidence so far is contradictory for different regions and countries around the 
world. Actually, the nature of nexus between electricity consumption and economic output 
can be expressed as an electricity consumption function, according to the economic theory.  
The reason why there are different empirical results on this topic is that such an electricity 
consumption function has not been developed before in the literature. So, this study derives 
the optimal electricity consumption function by the solving for the optimal inter-temporal 
income problem, but it is different from the traditional optimal inter-temporal utility model 
(He and Gao 2017). The concept of a consumption function dates back to the origin of 
Keynesian macroeconomics where The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and 
Money emphasized the central importance of consumption (Carroll and Kimball 1996). A 
consumption function reflects the relationship between consumption and economic output 
(Gao and He 2017). As summarized in section 3.2, there is an extensive literature which 
estimates the nexus between electricity consumption and national income as measured by 
gross domestic production (GDP). Little attention, however, has been paid to developing a 
theoretical basis for connecting electricity consumption with GDP using an optimal 
inter-temporal model. 
In addition to a limited exploration of theory concerning electricity consumption 
function, electricity demand management reform is another seldom researched aspect of 
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electricity markets. In terms of the metropolitans in China, they always face electricity 
power shortages. One response to these shortages is to implement reform of electricity 
markets. For instance, the electricity consumption changes as the rule of electricity demand 
management changes. So, institutional reform matters in the electricity consumption 
function. 
The example of interest in this research is Guangzhou where a prolonged process of 
electricity market reform has occurred since 1985 (Pollitt et al. 2017). Up until 1984, 
consumption of electricity was measured on a community basis (not individual household), 
so that household payments for electricity reflected average usage all households in the 
community. However, in 1985, individual household metering of consumption began in 
order for electricity payments to reflect household level consumption. This electricity 
demand management reform has the electricity use transit from community (public) usage 
to individual (private) usage for the residential customers (households), which produces an 
incentive for households to save electricity. This change required that electric grids be 
adjusted to the ―ammeter sole use system‖ to help alleviate shortages of electricity. In 
addition, a schedule of peak rates for commercial and industrial customers was designed to 
save the electricity consumption and alleviate electricity shortages. Specifically, during the 
peak demand period, a charge from 1.3 to 1.5 times the basic electricity rate is levied. So, 
the electricity demand reform can alleviate electricity shortages efficiently. 
The three objectives of this essay are to: (1) establish a theoretical basis for an 
electricity consumption function using optimal control theory, (2) empirically examine the 
relationship between electricity consumption and economic output in Guangzhou of China, 
and (3) introduce electricity demand management reform into both the theoretical and 
empirical models, because electricity demand management reform could be a key driver of 
affordable and efficient electricity services consumption through economic growth.  This 
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research is based upon the perspective that with rising income, consumers are more likely 
to afford electronic appliances, such as televisions, refrigerators, washing machines, 
computers, and air conditioners, thus increasing the demand for electricity (Huang et al. 
2018). This perspective leads to three questions:  
(1) What is a theoretically appropriate relationship between electricity consumption 
and economic output?  
(2) If economic output increases, will that cause more electricity consumption?  
(3) How does reform of electricity demand management impact electricity 
consumption? 
 
The contributions of this essay include: (1) development of an inter-temporal 
optimization model that connects electricity consumption to economic output based upon 
electricity consumption habits, which has not been discussed in the literature, (2) design of 
a natural experiment using kink regression discontinuity approach to investigate the effect 
of the 1985 electricity demand management reform that occurred in Guangzhou on 
electricity consumption.  
This section provides a brief introduction of the background and motivation of this 
research. Sections 3.3 and 3.4 present the theoretical model and subsequent methods 
following the pathways shown in Figure 3.1. In section 3.2, I discuss the literature on 
general consumption function and the nexus between electricity consumption and economic 
output. In section 3.3, I outline the theoretical framework applying the optimal control 
theory to derive the metropolitan electricity consumption function. Section 3.4 introduces 
the time series econometric methods to test the unit root and cointegration for the data 
utilized in the analysis. Empirical results will be addressed in section 3.5. Finally, section 
3.6 presents conclusions and further discussion. 
 
3.2 Literature Review 
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3.2.1 Literature on General Consumption Function 
The nature of the relationship between electricity consumption and economic output 
in economic theory can be expressed as the electricity consumption function which is the 
function of income or wealth. In the economic literature, since Friedman (1957), many 
economists have conducted theoretic and empirical research to the consumption function 
(Gorman, 1964). Spiro (1962) finds that if income is to remain permanently constant, the 
desired stock of wealth will ultimately be accumulated and therefore consumption would 
equal net income. The Zellner consumption function (Zellner 1957) fits well but gives 
rather low estimate of the long run marginal propensity to consume and a rather high and 
hard to interpret coefficient for the liquid assets variable (Griliches et al. 1962). 
In terms of consumption function theory development (Zellner and Geisel 1970), 
Thompson (1967) asserts and demonstrates an equivalence that exists between the utility 
function and standard aggregate consumption function.  
Baxter and Moosa (1996) propose to split consumption expenditure on non-durable 
items into ‗basic needs‘ and other expenditure. Foldes (1996) considers a neo-classical 
model of optimal economic growth with population growth, technological progress. Gong 
et al. (2012) broadens the conclusion of Carroll et al. (1996) for the case of the HARA 
utility function. 
However, recently, the economists gradually transfer into the empirical research on 
consumption function from the theoretical modeling. Hence, I would derive an electricity 
consumption function. 
3.2.2 Literature on the Relationship between Electricity Consumption and GDP 
In this section, I start to review the main literature on the relationship between 
electricity consumption and GDP. Table 3.1 lists the summary of recent literature review for 
those four hypotheses on the nexus between electricity consumption and economic output 
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for different regions and countries around the world. The first of these is the conservation 
hypothesis implying unidirectional Granger causality running from economic output to 
electricity consumption. In contrast, the growth hypothesis postulates unidirectional 
Granger causality running from electricity consumption to economic output. The feedback 
hypothesis contemplates bidirectional Granger causality such that electricity consumption 
and economic output mutually influence each other. The fourth view is the neutrality 
hypothesis of no direct Granger causal links between electricity consumption and economic 
output (He et al. 2017). 
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Table 3. 1: Summary of Recent Literature Review for Electricity Consumption and 
Economic Output 
Study Methodology Time Period Region/ Country Hypothesis 
Ghosh (2002) Granger causality test 1950 -1997 India conservation 
Jumbe (2004) Granger causality test 1970-1999 Malawi conservation 
Chen et al. (2007) Pairwise Granger causality test 1971- 2001 10 Asian countries conservation 
Jamil and Ahmad (2010) Granger causality test 1960–2008  Pakistan conservation 
Shahbaz et al.(2011) Granger causality test 1971- 2009  Portugal conservation 
Ikegami and Wang (2016) Granger causality test 1996Q4–2015Q2 Japan and Germany conservation 
Shiu and Lam (2004) Granger causality test 1971–2000 China  growth 
Altinay and Karagol (2005) Granger causality test 1950–2000 Turkey  growth 
Yuan et al. (2007) Granger causality test 1978–2004  China growth 
Ho and Siu (2007) Granger causality test 1966 -2002 Hong Kong  growth 
Narayan and Singh (2007) Granger causality test 1979- 2000 Fiji growth 
Akinlo (2009) Granger causality test 1980–2006 Nigeria  growth 
Ciarreta and Zarraga (2010) Granger causality test 1970–2007 
12 European 
countries  
growth 
Bildirici and Kayikçi (2012) Granger causality test 1990–2009 Soviet Republics  growth 
Al-Mulali et al. (2014) Granger causality test 1980–2010 
18 Latin American 
countries 
growth 
He et al.( 2017) VECM Granger causality test 1950-2013 Guangzhou of China  growth 
Yoo (2005) Granger causality test 1970–2002  Korea  feedback 
Yoo (2006) Granger causality test 1971–2002 
Malaysia and 
Singapore 
feedback 
Tang (2008) Granger causality test 
1972 quarter 1 to 
2003 quarter 4 
Malaysia  feedback 
Odhiambo (2009) Granger causality test 1971-2006 South Africa  feedback 
Narayan and Prasad (2008) Panel Granger causality 1974–2002 
Middle Eastern 
countries  
feedback 
Yang et al. (2010) Granger causality test 1982-2008 Taiwan feedback 
Acaravci (2010) Granger causality test 1977- 2006 Turkey feedback 
Shahbaz and Lean (2012) Granger causality test 1972-2009  Pakistan feedback 
Ouédraogo (2010) Granger causality test 1968–2003  Burkina Faso  feedback 
Hamdi et al. (2014) VECM Granger causality test  
1980 quarter 1–
2010 quarter 4 
Bahrain feedback 
Ozturk and Acaravci (2011) Granger causality test 1971- 2006 
Middle East and 
North Africa 
countries  
neutrality 
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According the literature above, the nexus between electricity consumption and 
economic output has been extensively studied but the evidence so far is contradictory and 
inconclusive (Stern et al. 2018). Most of the scholars above just make good use of the 
national level data without any institutional factors, and there has been limited attention in 
economic literature devoted to investigating the effect of total income combining electricity 
demand management reform on electricity consumption in metropolitan area. Comparing to 
the current studies, I try to set up a theoretical model to investigate the relationship between 
electricity consumption and gross products (total income), and concentrate on using the 
data from the metropolitan level in Guangzhou, China and consider the policy implication.  
 
3.3 Theoretic Model 
 
My first objective is to derive a metropolitan electricity consumption function that 
rests upon a theoretical basis of an optimally allocating government expenditures on 
electricity infrastructure in order to maximize a metropolitan‘s inter-temporal total income 
(Y). This objective is based on an assumption that competition between regions motivates 
subnational metropolitan‘s officials to maximize a metropolitan‘s inter-temporal total 
income. Chinese metropolitans compete against each other for performance rankings and 
metropolitan officials‘ careers are linked to their performance in the tournaments (Xu 2011). 
The most popular performance indicator used in metropolitan rankings is GDP (Xu 2011). 
By linking metropolitan performance to officials‘ promotion, tournament-like metropolitan 
competition provides high-powered incentives to subnational officials to maximize total 
income in the whole metropolitan society (Xu 2011). In addition, according to Wagner‘s 
Law, an increase in total income in the society has a positive effect on government 
spending (Kónya and Abdullaev 2018). Hence, in order to increase their share of the 
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economy, officials consider maximizing total income in their metropolitan as an incentive 
(Narayan et al. 2008). 
Based on that assumption, the inter-temporal metropolitan total income function ( ) 
can be expressed as below:  
  ∑  
 
 = 
 
 
   
          
where   represents a social discount rate and T represents metropolitan government‘s 
planning period. With a constrained optimization, I turn my attention to the constraints. 
First, there is a constraint based on an income accounting identity:  
   C  I     (3.2) 
where consumption is C , I  denotes all investment (private and public) that is outside the 
electricity generation industry, and    denotes government investment on electricity 
infrastructure, all in year t. Investment is the change in the economy‘s stock of capital: 
I               (3.3) 
where   denotes depreciation rate of capital. Hence, plug (3.3) into (3.2), I obtain: 
   C                          
Writing this identity in discrete-time form, I have: 
           C               
where   represents the capital depreciation rate.  
The production function for Yt is assumed to be represented in Cobb-Douglas (C-D) 
form: 
 𝑌       E      A   
 E 
   
         
where A  denotes technology level,    is capital, E  is electricity utilized in production, 
and    is labor. The parameters of equation (3.6) are restricted as:           
           . An aggregate C-D production function is assumed here to help ensure 
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well behaved solutions. Here, production represents the total supply of metropolitan goods 
and services. A change of capital stock can be derived from (3.5) and (3.6) as:  
             E      C                
The second constraint comes from the capacity of electricity production due to 
available infrastructure. To express this constraint, I use F  to represent value of electricity 
infrastructure at year t and Gt to represent annual investment on electricity infrastructure. 
So, the value of electricity infrastructure at year t+1 (Ft+1) is composed of annual 
investment on electricity infrastructure (Gt) and the value of remaining electricity 
infrastructure. A convenient way of modeling the latter is to assume that the value of 
remaining electricity infrastructure at the end of year t is (F   F  , where the electricity 
infrastructure depreciation rate is  . Therefore, I define changes in the value of electricity 
infrastructure as 
F    G    F   F   (3.8) 
Finally, the amount of electricity consumption, Et, is treated as the functional of the 
capacity of electricity infrastructure and other factors (ε  ε  D    involving electricity 
demand management reform  D  , so that E  F  ε  𝐷     F ε  𝐷  , where f is the 
transfer coefficient representing what percentage of stock of electricity generated from 
electricity infrastructure can be effectively used, and ε  will be transferred as the form of 
the error term in the econometric model. 
Therefore, I have the following set-up for an optimal control problem:  
   
  
∑   
 
 =  
 
   
           (3.9) 
s.t.         A   
   ε  𝐷  F  
   
  C         
F    F  G   F  
 35 
 
  =K* and    is free 
F =F
*
 and F  is free 
G   , F             
where A ,   , and C  are supposed to be exogenous variables,    is control variable,    
and F  are state variables. Finally, the electricity consumption function is derived as below 
with more details about this derivation provided in Appendix B1: 
                   E      𝐷  𝑣          
  
3.4 Econometric Methods and Data 
 
To estimate an electricity consumption function, the first step is to conduct the unit 
root tests without and with break data (Figure 3.1).  If the variables are stationary at level, 
I can run the OLS regression directly, since there is no spurious issue in that case. However, 
if the variables are found to be non-stationary at level, the process is to continue to conduct 
the unit root tests for all variables at first difference. When variables are stationary at first 
difference, I can further conduct cointegration tests by Johansen and ARDL approaches. If 
there is cointegration relationship among variables, the spurious problem will be solved and 
then the Granger Causality tests and Kink Discontinuity Regression method can be 
conducted. According to Chow and Niu (2015), I do not involve any time dummy variables, 
interaction terms containing time dummy variable and lagged variables in the unit-root and 
cointegration tests. 
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Figure 3. 1: Structural Flow Chart of the Theory and Econometric Methods Utilized in Chapter 3 
3.4.1 Unit Root and Cointegration Tests  
Because standard Granger causality tests should be conducted on stationary time 
series or cointegration with unit root process, I first test the unit roots of Xt to confirm the 
stationary properties of each variable. This is achieved by using the Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller test (Dickey and Fuller 1979; Mackinnon 1996). For the time series Xt 
representing lnEt and lnYt, the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) relationship is expressed 
as: 
𝑋 =     𝑋      t  ∑  
𝑙
 = 
∆𝑋                 
where Δ is the difference operator, l is the auto-regressive lag length that must be large 
enough to eliminate possible serial correlation in βi,    is a constant,    is the coefficient 
of interest, α  is the coefficient on a time trend, and ut is the error term.  
In addition, Phillips and Perron (1988) propose an alternative (nonparametric) method 
of controlling for serial correlation when testing for a unit root. The PP test is as below: 
Estimation of Electricity Consumption Function  
Unit Root Test 
Co-integration: Johansen and ARDL Bounds  
Stationary at Level OLS Regression 
Stationary at 1
st
 difference 
Specification of Electricity Consumption Function 
 
Unit Root Test without 
break date: ADF and PP 
Unit Root Test with break 
date: Perron and ZA 
Granger Causality Test 
Institutional Experiment with KRD 
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𝑋 =     t    𝑋                 
However, when there are any structural breaks in the data, the ADF test is biased 
towards a spurious acceptance of non-stationarity because of misspecification bias and size 
distortions. The Perron‘s test allows for a one-time change in structure occurring at time T B 
(1< TB <T, T is the number of observations). The model is considered in this test: one that 
allows for an exogenous change in the level of the series： 
𝑋 =     𝐷  
        𝑋    ∑  
𝑙
 = 
∆𝑋                                   
where DTt
*
 = t -TB if t>TB and 0 otherwise. The null hypothesis implies that the data are 
non-stationary. In this test the alternative is taken as trend-stationary with a terminal at time 
T. 
The choice of the breakpoint thus is correlated with the data utilized and the choice of 
breakpoint cannot be considered as independent of the data. Zivot and Andrews test (Zivot 
and Andrews 1992) addresses this issue by estimating the structural break data 
endogenously instead of considering an exogenous break date. I estimate the following 
equations for the Zivot and Andrews test with the endogenous location of the breakpoint λ= 
TB / T: 
𝑋 =     𝐷  
  λ        𝑋    ∑  
𝑙
 = 
∆𝑋                                         
The Johansen multivariate cointegration test (Johansen 1995) takes the following form as 
below:  
∆    =  β       ∑ϑ 
𝑙
 = 
∆       φ  𝑌                
Another way to verify the cointegration relationship is to apply an ARDL model 
(Pesaran et al. 2001), if none of the series I am working with are I(2). The ARDL(p,q) 
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model used in this study is expressed as follows: 
                𝑌  ∑   
𝑝
 = 
       ∑   
𝑞  
 = 
∆   𝑌                  
  𝑌  𝑐             ∑𝑐  
𝑝
 = 
  𝑌    ∑𝑐  
𝑞  
 = 
∆                      
3.4.2 Granger Causality Test and Kink Discontinuity Regression 
Although the Johansen cointegration test and the ARDL approach to cointegration, 
explore whether the time-series data are cointegrated, they do not reveal the causality 
directions between lnEt and lnYt. For this purpose, I use the Granger causality (Granger 
1969) as below: 
        ∑  
𝑙
 = 
  𝑌    ∑  
𝑙
 = 
                    
  𝑌  𝑣  ∑𝑣 
𝑙
 = 
       ∑𝑤 
𝑙
 = 
  𝑌                 
In order to design an institutional experiment to investigate the causal effect of 
electricity demand management reform program on electricity consumption, I use the KRD 
(Kink Regression Discontinuity) approach for robustness analysis (Card et al. 2015). The 
idea of regression discontinuity design is that there is a continuous variable 
  𝑌  (assignment variable) which determines the treatment variable 𝐷  by a cutoff. The 
random distribution of samples in a small neighborhood [𝛿    𝛿   ] of      is 
regarded as ―quasi experiment‖. By estimating LATE (Local Average Treatment Effect), it 
is possible to identify whether the dependent variable (    ) has a cutoff at   𝑌   𝛿, where 
bandwidth    𝑟 𝑚  
∑ [     𝐸   𝑌  ]
2𝑇
 =1
 
 and 
  ATE   i   𝑌 →𝛿 E        i   𝑌 →𝛿 E      . The null hypothesis of the test is: 
  ≡  i   𝑌 →𝛿       i   𝑌 →𝛿       . Since the electricity demand management 
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reform occurred from 1985,   𝑌     is treated as the cutoff. 
So, 𝐷  {
         ≤  ≤     
         ≤  ≤     
.  
A generalization of electricity consumption function based on equation (3.10) allows 
different trend function for E[     |  𝑌 ] and E[     |  𝑌 ]. Modeling both of these 
conditional expectation functions (CEFs), I have 
E[     |  𝑌 ]                𝑌          E    
E[     |  𝑌 ]                   𝑌          E    
To derive a regression model that can be used to estimate the causal effect of interest 
in this case, I use the fact that 𝐷  is a deterministic function of      to write 
E[    |  𝑌 ]  E[     |  𝑌 ]   E[     |  𝑌 ]  E[     |  𝑌 ] 𝐷       
Substituting regression for conditional expectations, then I have 
                   𝑌          E      𝐷                   𝑌     𝐷  𝑣  
          𝑌                  E    [            𝑌       ]𝐷      
     𝐷      𝑣  
And the electricity consumption functions by regression discontinuity reduced form 
can be expressed as below: 
                   E      𝐷    𝐷      𝑣          
where            𝑌    ,       ,      ,                𝑌       , 
and           . 
3.4.3 Background 
To estimate the metropolitan electricity consumption function, I utilize time series 
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data from Guangzhou. With over 2,100 years of history, Guangzhou is a major commercial 
center in south China (He et al. 2017). As the capital of Canton Province, it is located 
within 120 km of both Hong Kong and Macau. Because Guangzhou is adjacent to Hong 
Kong (Figure 3.2), which was a colony of the Britain from 1842 to 1997 and is a typical 
market economy metropolitan in the world, the Chinese central government let Guangzhou 
be the experimental metropolitan can reduce institutional learning and imitating costs. So, 
Guangzhou becomes the commercial and free trade center of south China (Bercht 2013).  
Guangzhou is the third largest metropolitan area in China, after Beijing and 
Shanghai, and the largest city in south central China (Yang et al. 2012). Moreover, the 
Guangzhou Statistical Division provides the most complete and longest duration time series 
dataset (from 1949 to 2016) among the metropolitans in China. It helps me to observe and 
estimate the electricity consumption function with electricity demand management reform. 
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Figure 3. 2: Map of Guangzhou‘s Location in China 
 
3.4.4 Data 
Annual data from 1949 to 2016 were obtained from the Guangzhou statistical 
yearbook from 2000-2016 and the Guangzhou 50 years. Table 3.2 lists the variables, their 
definitions and summary statistics for all variables included in the sample. According to the 
form of electricity consumption function in equation (3.10), the dependent variable is the 
natural logarithmic of metropolitan electricity consumption (lnE). The main independent 
variable is the natural logarithmic of metropolitan economic output (lnY).  
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Table 3. 2: Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Definition Mean Max Min 
Standard 
Deviation 
Observations 
lnE 
natural 
logarithmic of 
total Electricity 
Consumption 
15.0042 18.22657 10.79384 2.072003 68 
lnY 
natural 
logarithmic of 
(Gross 
Metropolitan 
Income*(CPI2016 
/CPIt)) 
25.25871 28.18772 22.55819 1.543671 68 
Note: 1) The Megawatt Hours is the unit for measuring electricity consumption (E) and it is equal to 1000 
kilowatts of electricity used continuously for one hour; 2) The Yuan is the unit in China for measuring income 
(Y). 
 
 
Figure 3. 3: Time Trend of Annual Electricity Consumption in Guangzhou (1949-2016) 
 
 43 
 
 
Figure 3. 4: Time Trend of Annual Gross Metropolitan Income in Guangzhou (1949-2016) 
 
Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4 illustrates the evolution of electricity consumption and 
gross metropolitan income in Guangzhou throughout the course of the sample period. As 
can be seen, growth in electricity consumption has accelerated since 1985. This 
acceleration coincides with the rapid expansion of economic activity observed since 1985 
in much of Guangzhou. The growth rates of Y before and after 1985 are 9.9% and 24.7%, 
while growth rates of E before and after 1985 are 64.51% and 18.34%.  
 
3.5 Empirical Evidence 
 
3.5.1 Unit Root Tests 
(1) ADF Test and PP Test 
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ADF test and PP test are applied to detect the possible presence of unit roots in lnYt and 
lnEt. The null hypothesis of unit root can be rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis of 
no unit root when the p-value is small (He and Gao 2017). Table 3.3 indicates that no 
variable is stationary in their levels since the p-values for each variable are greater than 10%. 
On the other hand, lnYt and lnEt are stationary process in their first differences because the 
p-values for lnYt are smaller than 1% in both ADF test and PP test. Furthermore, the 
p-values for lnEt are smaller than 1% in both tests. 
 
Table 3. 3: ADF and PP Unit Root Tests Results 
ADF Test PP Test 
Variable ADF-test 
statistics 
C,L,T P-value Variable PP-test 
statistic 
C,B,T P-value 
lnYt 5.0033 (0,0,0) 1.0000 lnYt 4.4939 (0,1,0) 1.0000 
lnEt -2.3084 (C,0,T) 0.4235 lnEt -2.2259 (C,8,T) 0.4676 
ΔlnYt -6.3046*** (C,0,0) 0.0000 ΔlnYt -6.2419*** (C,3,0) 0.0000 
ΔlnEt -5.4752*** (C,2,0) 0.0000 ΔlnEt -8.2560*** (C,9,T) 0.0000 
Note: 1) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; 2) C, L, T, and B represent the constant, and lag length, time 
trend, bandwidth, respectively. 
 
(2) Perron’s modified ADF test and Zivot–Andrews test 
The results of Perron‘s modified ADF test and Zivot–Andrews test are detailed in Table 
3.4 and Table 3.5, respectively. They show that non-stationary processes are found in all 
series at level but variables are found to be stationary at first difference. This confirms that 
lnYt and lnEt are integrated at I(1). 
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Table 3. 4: Perron‘s Modified ADF Unit Root Test Results 
Variable Break 
Data 
T-statistic C,L,T 10%critical 
value 
5%critical 
value 
1%critical 
value 
lnYt 1988 -3.1969 （0,1,0） -4.4800 -4.8300 -5.4500 
lnEt 1960 -3.7225 （0,0,T） -4.4800 -4.8300 -5.4500 
ΔlnYt 1961 -6.8583*** （0,0,T） -4.4800 -4.8300 -5.4500 
ΔlnEt 1968 -8.8418*** （0,0,T） -4.4800 -4.8300 -5.4500 
Note: 1) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; 2) C, L, and T represent the constant, and lag length, 
time trend, respectively. 
 
Table 3. 5: Zivot-Andrews Unit Root Test Results 
Variable Break 
Data 
T-statistic C,L,T 10% critical 
value 
5%critical 
value 
1%critical 
value 
lnYt 1961 -3.5614 （0,1,T） -4.5800 -4.9300 -5.3400 
lnEt 1977 -3.7630 （0,1,T） -4.5800 -4.9300 -5.3400 
ΔlnYt 1964 -7.0979* （C,0,T） -4.8200 -5.0800 -5.5700 
ΔlnEt 1961 -6.9224*** （0,1,T） -4.8200 -5.0800 -5.5700 
Note: 1) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; 2) C, L, and T represent the constant, and lag length, 
time trend, respectively. 
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3.5.2 Cointegration Tests 
Table 3.6 shows the lag order in Johansen test is one. 
 
Table 3. 6: Lag Order Selection Criteria 
        Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
0 -144.6302 NA   0.3883  4.7300  4.7986  4.7569 
1  96.2876  458.5210  0.0001 -2.9125*  -2.7066*  -2.8316* 
2  99.6402  6.1644  0.0001 -2.8916 -2.5485 -2.7569 
3  105.2899   10.0236   0.0001  -2.9448 -2.4645 -2.7562 
4  106.5134  2.0916  0.0001 -2.8552 -2.2377 -2.6128 
5  108.1155  2.6358  0.0002 -2.7779 -2.0231 -2.4815 
6  109.6122  2.3656  0.0002 -2.6971 -1.8051 -2.3469 
       Note: 1)* indicates lag order selected by the criterion. 2) LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% 
level).3) FPE: Final prediction error. 4) AIC: Akaike information criterion. 5) SC: Schwarz information criterion. 6)  HQ: 
Hannan-Quinn information criterion. 
 
Based upon unit root test results, integration of variables is of the same order so that I 
continue to test whether these variables are cointegrated over the sample period (Gao and He 
2017). The Johansen cointegration test in Table 3.7 shows the trace statistic for 
non-cointegrating equations (29.0565) is greater than the 5% critical value (20.2618), but not 
for the at most one cointegrating equation (p-value 0.2781 is greater than 10%). This test 
rejects the hypothesis of none cointegration and indicates that there is at least one 
cointegrating equation at the 5% significance level, demonstrating there is a long-run 
relationship between lnYt and lnEt for Guangzhou.  
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Table 3. 7: Johansen Cointegration Test Results 
Hypothesized Number of Cointegrating 
equation 
Trace Statistic 5%Critical 
Value 
P-value 
None
*** 
 29.0565  20.2618  0.0024 
At most 1
 
 5.0494  9.1645  0.2781 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
  
The results of the bound test are given in Table 3.8. From these results, there is a long 
run relationship exists between lnYt and lnEt, because their F-statistic (10.1886) are higher 
than the upper-bound critical value (5.5800) at the 1% level. This implies that the null 
hypothesis of no cointegration between lnYt and lnEt is rejected, when lnEt is dependent 
variable.  
Table 3. 8: Bounds Test Results 
Estimated model Lag length F-statistic 
f (lnYt/lnEt) (1,1) 1.2110 
f (lnEt/lnYt) (1,3) 10.1886*** 
1% critical values I(0) I(1) 
4.9400 5.5800 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
3.5.3 VECM Granger Causality Analysis 
Table 3.9 reports the Granger causality analysis between lnYt and lnEt based on 
Vector Error Correction Model. Only in the long run, there is a unidirectional Granger 
causality from lnYt to lnEt since the related p-value of ECTt-1 (0.0048) is less than a 1% level. 
Moreover, the coefficient of ECTt-1 is negative and significant. Furthermore, this Granger 
Causality demonstrates that the evidence from Guangzhou supports the conservation 
hypothesis. This result is inconsistent with the finding that confirms the Granger Causality 
running from electricity consumption per capita to economic output per capita in the short 
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run for Guangzhou (He et al 2017). However, the latter neglects the further discussion on 
the Granger Causality test for long-run.  
Moreover, the empirical results in Table 3.8 just reflect Granger Causality between 
electricity consumption and economic output, which means a variable lnYt is useful in 
forecasting another variable lnEt (past values of lnYt should contain information that helps 
predict lnEt above and beyond the information contained in past values of lnEt alone) but 
this does not imply that lnYt actually causes lnEt, in terms of causal inference (Angrist and 
Pischke 2008). So as to investigate the actual causal effect between electricity consumption 
and economic output, I need to continue to conduct the causal inference by using Kink 
Regression Discontinuity approach (Card et al. 2015). 
 
Table 3. 9: VECM Granger Causality Analysis 
Dependent  
variable 
Wald statistics 
Short run Long run 
ΣΔ lnY t − 1 ΣΔlnE t − 1 ECT t − 1 
ΔlnYt - 1.1692 (0.5573) 0.1186 (0.7305) 
[0.0103] 
ΔlnEt 2.8743( 0.2376) - 7.9511***(0.0048) 
[-0.0818] 
Note: 1) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; 2) Values in parenthesis are p-values; 3) Values in square brackets 
are estimated coefficients of ECTt − 1. 
 
3.5.4 Regression Results from Institutional Experiment using KRD 
In order to further examine the effect of institutional reform on electricity consumption, 
I continue to design an institutional experiment from 1985 using kink regression 
discontinuity.  
Because electricity demand management reform in Guangzhou started in 1985, the 
natural log of real GDP in 1985 (lnY1985) serves as a cutoff to compare electricity 
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consumption prior to and after this date.  Therefore, the lnYt prior to 1985 are not exposed 
to reform while lnYt in 1985 and thereafter are exposed to reform.   
 
Table 3. 10: Results of Local Wald Estimation 
Period 1949-2016 
Cutoff Time 1985 
Variable Coefficient 
lwald 0.3694** (0.1702) 
N 68 
Note: 1) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; 2) Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 3.10 demonstrates that the local Wald estimator with one bandwidth during the 
period 1949 to 2016 is significantly positive, which confirms that the natural log of real 
GDP on 1985 is the cutoff, statistically (Appendix B2 Figure B1).  Table 3.11 illustrates 
that the total marginal effects of lnYt are significantly positive both prior to 1985 (0.3774) 
and after 1985 (0.2207=0.3774-0.1567). This result means that while real GDP drives up 
electricity consumption throughout the entire time-period in Guangzhou, after electricity 
institutional reform, its impact is lessened. Since the total marginal effect of lnYt represents 
the income elasticity of electricity demand, I find that electricity consumption under the 
context of electricity demand management reform increases by 0.2207%, for an 1% change 
in economic output. Therefore, these results also confirm that there is true causality 
relationship running from economic output to electricity consumption, which is consistent 
with the empirical results from Granger Causality Test in Table 3.9. 
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Table 3. 11: Results of Kink Regression Discontinuity (Dependent Variable：lnEt) 
Variable Coefficient Robust standard errors 
Dt 0.0207 0.0463 
lnYt 0.3774 *** 0.1201 
Dt * lnYt -0.1567* 0.0829 
lnEt-1 0.8014*** 0.0462 
Constant 2.6401 *** 0.5982 
Adjusted R-squared 0.9955  
Bandwidth 2.3461  
N 55  
Note: 1) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; 2) bandwidth =2.3400. 
 
Moreover, since the coefficient of Dt *lnYt is negative and statistically significant, 
after the electricity demand management reform, I conclude that the income elasticity of 
electricity consumption is lower after reform. I attribute this result to the electricity demand 
management reform where electricity use has transitioned from community (public) usage 
to individual (private) usage for the residential customers (households). So, it is presumed 
that the consumers prefer to purchase more energy-efficient appliances (such as compact 
fluorescent lamp or light emitting diode lamp) when their income increases after reform. 
This reform created incentives for households to save electricity (He and Gao 2017). In 
addition, the regime of peak period rate also constrains commercial and industrial 
customers‘ demand for electricity. Finally, the coefficient of lnEt-1 is positive and 
statistically significant (Table 3.11). This result means that previous electricity 
consumption habits have a ―path dependence‖ effect on current electricity consumption, 
because the consumer has formed the habits of consuming electricity.  
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3.6 Conclusions 
To analyze the nexus between electricity consumption and metropolitan economic 
output in Guangzhou City, China, I develop a theoretical framework utilizing an 
inter-temporal constrained optimization of societal income with government investments in 
electricity infrastructure which includes aspects of electricity consumption habits by 
consumers and electricity demand management reform. A natural experiment design with a 
kink regression discontinuity method is utilized to evaluate the electricity consumption 
function after reform. Therefore, a metropolitan electricity consumption function is derived 
and estimated including GDP, electricity consumption habits, and electricity demand 
management reform in this study. 
Previous studies have explored the nexus between electricity consumption and GDP by 
only examining empirical relationships without developing an underlying theoretical basis 
for this relationship (Ghosh 2002; Ikegami and Wang 2016; He et al 2017). It implies that 
previous studies of electricity consumption and income that don‘t develop a theory model. 
Although some empirical researchers have examined Granger causality between electricity 
consumption and GDP, they do not provide an underlying theoretical explanation for the 
logic of such a linkage between economic output and electricity consumption.  
Based on the theoretical hypothesis, the empirical results demonstrate three findings: 
(1) unidirectional Granger causality running from economic output to electricity 
consumption, (2) given electricity consumption habits under the context of the electricity 
demand management reform, an economic output increase of 1% results in the increase of 
electricity consumption by 0.22% (the income elasticity demand of electricity), and (3), 
after the electricity demand management reform, economic output continues to increase 
electricity consumption, but at a lower rate than prior to reform. 
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The empirical results in this study imply that the ‗conservation hypothesis‘ is upheld 
over the long-run at the regional level in Guangzhou. That outcomes of Granger Causality 
Test before and after electricity demand management reform are similar to what has been 
conducted using the whole data from 1949 to 2016 for Guangzhou (Tables B1 and B2 in 
Appendix B2). It is instructive that, electricity consumption is the consequence of income 
growth.  
This study is also helpful in balancing the relationship between electricity use and 
economic reform. Especially, the experience of electricity demand management reform in 
Guangzhou provides the evidence that the ―ammeter sole use system‖ improves the 
electricity use efficiency (units of electricity use per unit of GDP), because the individual 
pays any units of electricity that he or she actually uses.  
Different from the conventional research on economic impact of energy use (Collins et 
al. 2012), the literature on the electricity-growth nexus is dominated by empirical research 
(Payne 2010). However, these are variability of causality results, particularly across sample 
periods, sample sizes, and model specification (Smyth 2013). Further research in these 
areas may shed light on regional variations in the functional form of electricity 
consumption. 
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Chapter 4: The Effect of Information Structure on Farmland Lease 
Contractual Choice: Evidence from Canton, China 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The farmland leasing contractual choice has been discussed in the economic literature 
on land tenancy efficiency from the class theory of share tenancy by Cheung (1968) to a 
recent synthesis by (Allen and Lueck 2018). The dominant view before Cheung (1968) 
maintained that share contract resulted in inefficient resource allocation because the 
share-tenant is said to result in less intensive farming because the tenant‘s incentive to work 
or invest in land is reduced (Johnson 1950). But Cheung (1968) argues that share contract 
can also result in the efficient resource allocation, the same as fixed-rent contract, under the 
assumption of zero cost of contracting. However, in the real world with non-zero 
transaction costs, what types of farmland leasing contract will be optimal in the agrarian 
economy?  
The prolific literature on land tenancy has focused on the choice between share and 
fixed-rent tenancy contracts (Hayami and Otsuka 1993). The literature abounds with studies 
that investigate the efficiency of land rent sharing contract which can be divided into three 
groups (He et al. 2018): The first is based on moral hazard model (Stiglitz 1974). The 
second set of papers emphasize on empirical transactional costs paradigm (Allen and Lueck 
1999). To the best of our knowledge, the main study recently focuses on the contract 
matching model (Niederle 2007).  
According to the literature above, I ask the following questions: (1) What is the 
relationship between information structure and farmland contractual choice? (2) Under 
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what kind of information environment would fixed-rent contract be the optimal institutional 
arrangement? (3) Under what kind of condition would land lessor regard a share contract as 
optimal rather than a fixed-rent contract? and (4) What are the results of different empirical 
methods in examining the effect of information structure on farmland contractual choice? 
So, the effect of information structure on farmland leasing contractual choice can be 
estimated by understanding rural community relations that reinforce the mechanism of 
contract enforcement envisaged by quasi-experiment of propensity scores matching based 
on the treatment assuming that contracts between internal individuals (inside the same 
village) operate under complete information and that contracts between external individuals 
(tenant is from outside the village) operate under incomplete information. 
Therefore, this study combines a theoretical model with an empirical analysis of 
farmland lease contracts. The theoretical part derives implications which explore farmland 
lease contractual choice under different information structures. Two related hypotheses are 
derived in this research. The first relates to complete information, under which it is found 
that land lessor prefers a fixed-rent contract as the optimal institutional arrangement. The 
second hypothesis involves incomplete information between the tenant and land lessor 
where a share contract is found to be the optimal choice for land lessor. Based upon the two 
hypotheses above, empirical evidence will be presented to confirm that land lessor who 
leases the farmland to an internal individual (inside the lessor‘s own village) which is 
assumed to be a tenant under complete information has a higher probability of choosing a 
fixed-rent contract. Conversely, land lessor who leases to an external individual outside 
their village (operating as a tenant under incomplete information) is more likely to choose 
share contract.  
The empirical part of this study applies the econometric methods to test the theoretical 
implications utilizing field survey data collected from Canton of China. Although similar 
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contracts have been observed in several provinces in China, Canton has been chosen for the 
empirical part of this study. During the phase of the reform and openness program in China, 
farmland leasing in Canton is more frequent than other provinces because Canton is the 
main and the first province to adopt marketization reform program especially involving 
farmland leasing market reform in China (Wang and Zhang 2017).  
However, Cheung (1968)‘s share contract theory bases on two assumption-private 
property rights and zero transactional costs. But they are contradictory. Private property 
rights imply that State have to invest resource to define and protect individual‘s property 
rights, so the value of such investment is transactional cost. It means that private property 
rights and zero transactional costs cannot exist at the same time. Furthermore, Cheung 
(1968) failed to arrive at general equilibrium solutions, owing to an inability to derive some 
specific transaction-cost functions and to disentangle some problems of choice theory 
involving risk. So, the contributions of this essay include:  (1) I do not need the 
assumption of private ownership in Cheung (1968)‘s tenancy theory, and I integrate 
transaction costs into the theoretical model of contractual choice; (2) the moral hazard 
model (Stiglitz 1974) that is derived through asymmetric information game theory separates 
from conventional tax-equivalent approach, but I obtain a new solution by combining 
principal-agent model and revised tax-equivalent approach. My finding is that share 
contract is not the optimal choice for lessors under complete information, but it is the 
optimal choice under incomplete information. Thus, I provide new evidence from Canton 
of China to support the theoretical hypothesis above by use of the matching propensity 
score method; (3) Based on the theoretical implication in this study, given incomplete 
information, a share contract will be preferred by land lessor. This result is consistent with 
the theoretical findings from Newbery (1977) and Hallagan (1978), and is supported by the 
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empirical results from Ackerberg and Botticini (2000) and Bellemare (2012), which are 
based on the postulate of risk aversion, but my model does not need such assumption.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows (see Figure 4.1). A literature review and 
theoretic models are presented in sections 4.2 and 4.3, respectively. Section 4.4 describes 
the data and econometric methodology using a Logit model and propensity score matching.  
The empirical results of these analyses are presented section 4.5 and, finally, conclusions 
are presented in section 4.6. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. 1: Structural Flow Chart of the Theory and Econometric Methods Utilized in Chapter 4 
4.2 Literature Review 
 
The class of share tenancy theory proves that sharecropping results in efficient 
allocation of resources as illustrated by Cheung (1968). He argues that under the condition 
of zero transaction cost, a share contract, the same as the other forms of contracts, can result 
in efficient resource allocation (Cheung 1968). Specifically, ―the rent per acre of land 
equals the marginal product of land in equilibrium under share contract, which is a 
Hypothesis about Information Structure and Contractual Choice 
Extension: Propensity Score Matching 
 
Conclusions 
Logit Regression 
Theoretical Model 
Implications of effect of Information Structure on Contractual Choice 
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condition identical to that of a fixed-rent contract‖ (Cheung 1969). The tenant alone 
controls the residual claim under fixed-rent contract, while residual claim is mutually 
shared by the land lessor and the tenant under share contract (Cheung 1969). From the 
perspective of Coasian Theorem, given zero transaction costs, the efficient outcome will be 
achieved by private negotiation, regardless of who control the property rights (Coase 1960). 
Based on this logic, who controls the residual claim of farmland will not affect the 
efficiency of resource allocation, without transaction costs, through different kinds of 
contracts.  
Furthermore, Stiglitz (1974) derives a moral hazard model and proves that if the 
tenant‘s effort is costly to monitor, then the share contract may be rationalized as a 
risk-sharing device. Following Stiglitz‘s share contract theory above, economists have 
applied moral hazard model to conduct the empirical research on this topic. For example, 
Allen and Lueck (1999) find no evidence that it is important for the choice of contract 
between cash rent and crop share. Janvry and Sadoulet (2007) predict that contract terms 
will vary with the value to the tenant of unreported output as well as with any capacity of 
the principal to directly supervise the agent. Thus, the impression in the literature is that 
share tenancy results in low efficiency (Johnson 1950), because a share contract usually 
requires the tenant to pay the land lessor a specified proportion of the farm's production 
being similar to the taxation resulting in dead weight loss (Shavell 1979). However, the 
basic tenet of this essay is that the efficiency of a share contract must consider the 
information structure between the tenant and land lessor. In other words, different lease 
agreements will be the optimal institutional choice under different information conditions. 
However, instead of economic model of information, a transaction costs framework is 
developed to explain the choice in agricultural contracts (Alston and Ferrie 1993). 
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Furthermore, in my theoretical model, I consider contracting cost as a part of transaction 
cost that dissipates additional income. 
The general treatment of land tenancy contracts is based on the theory of the 
principal-agent relationship (Hayami and Otsuka 1993), but it is extended to multitasking 
problem, mechanism design, and contractual choice between different organizations (Niu et 
al. 2016). Melkonyan (2004) examines how each of the supply-side effects manifests 
themselves in agricultural contracts. Schieffer et al. (2006) suggest that the determination of 
efficient policies to regulate agricultural contracts becomes dramatically more difficult and 
complex. Katchova (2010) shows that prices of agricultural contracts with cooperatives are 
not significantly different from those with investor-owned firms. 
A recent focus of economic literature is on the contract matching model (Niederle 
2007; Hatfield and Kojima 2009; Klaus and Walzl 2009;Hatfield and Kojima 2010; 
Westkamp 2010; Kominers 2012; Flanagan 2014;Risma 2015). However, this essay will try 
to design a one-to-one matching experiment in rural China on contractual choice in the 
empirical section. 
In terms of empirical studies in China, Lai et al. (2017) show that farmland leasing 
market contract interlinks with rural labor market contract in a non-specialized production 
system. Furthermore, He et al.(2018) introduce a game theoretical framework for farmland 
rent contract choice which incorporates the characteristic uncertainty about the quality of 
agricultural factors and heterogeneous agricultural attributes matching with rural land 
leasing contract and the dynamic contracting behavioral equilibrium. Their game theoretic 
model shows that farmland rent sharecropping is a Pareto optimum contract and that a 
different farmland use contractual arrangement will match with specific agricultural factors 
combination between farmland and labor. In addition, sequentially rational tenants will 
make the game lease from Nash Equilibrium to Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. Their 
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empirical results indicate that the tenant‘s age has significant negative effect on share 
contract, and social security, soil fertility and the number of plots have significant positive 
effects.   
 
4.3 Theoretic Model 
 4.3.1 The Basic Model 
 
Figure 4. 2: A Revised Cheung‘s Approach 
 
In this section, a theory of choice for farmland leasing contracts under different 
information structures is derived. The model is based on the premise of a competitive 
market. This model consists of a land lessor and a tenant. Let 𝑌         be the 
homogeneous production function, where t denotes tenant‘s labor input and l denotes the 
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quantity of farmland leased by the tenant. Let 𝑦  
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  . The marginal tenant cost, 
     
  
, is horizontal under a competitive labor market, 
with w reflecting the prevailing wage rate. It is important to note that in Cheung‘s model 
(1968), the horizontal axis is total labor of tenant t, so that the marginal product of labor 
diminishes as l increases. Cheung‘s model utilizes the assumption that farmland leased by 
the lessee is constant. By employing ratios of production and labor relative to land, the 
model developed in this essay does not need this assumption. Thus, it is a more generalized 
than Cheung‘s model. For instance, regardless of in the theoretical world or in the real 
world, tenants rent from more than one lessor so the amount of land leased can vary. So, 
Cheung‘s model does not consider this situation, but my model does. 
In Figure 4.2, according to the law of diminishing marginal productivity, the marginal 
product of labor per unit of farmland area,
  
  
, diminishes as k increases. Suppose the rent 
charged by the land lessor is r percent of the annual yield. So, 
  
  
   𝑟  is the marginal 
tenant income, defined as the change in tenant‘s income with respect to a change in tenant‘s 
labor input per farmland area used by the tenant. 
Under Cheung‘s approach of analyzing share tenancy, if the land lessor takes r percent 
of the annual yield and the tenant takes (1-r) percent, ）-1（ rk
f


 will be (1-r) percent of  
  
  
 at every point. With the tenant's decision made at the margin, it is said, equilibrium is at 
A, where 
   k 
  
 
  
  
   𝑟 . The associated quantity of tenant labor per unit of farmland 
area is 1k , represents tenant‘s optimal investment under share contract. Under this condition, 
the total product is represented by the area      1, with the land lessor getting a rent 
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equaling area       and the tenant's share equaling area 10EAkS . So, the shaded area MEAS ,
dkwr
k
k
f
])1([
1
0
 

, represents the additional income over and above tenant‘s alternative 
earning (area 10 1
wkS MAk  ), which is gained from his working on other economic 
activities. But in the long run equilibrium, there should be no such additional income for 
tenant. So, as we know, on the equilibrium A, the additional income is finally offset by 
tenant‘s transaction costs under incomplete information (
incomplete
pTC ): 
1
0
[ (1 ) ]
k
fincomplete
p MEA k
TC S r w dk


        (4.1) 
In the real world, tenants will seek to increase efficiency in agricultural production 
by leasing farmland under different types of contracts. The formation of the contract 
involves either a share contract or a fixed-rent contract. Any such leases, along with the 
associated coordination of land lessor in agricultural production, are costly events (Cheung 
1969). These costs are composed of three components: (1) negotiating costs between the 
contracting parties, (2) land lessor‘s local community organization cost for keeping an 
efficient personal connection network, and (3) the tenant‘s contracting costs from 
investment in specific asset (Williamson 1979). Of these three costs, the first one is 
probably the largest of the three transaction costs. 
The contracting costs from investment in specific asset refer to the facts that tenant 
has to invest in acquiring skills for cultivating, cultivation equipment (such as hoe) and 
agricultural machine (such as the combine for harvest) to satisfy an agricultural production. 
If the tenant cannot find a land to lease, he or she will lose his or her job in rural area and 
has to switches to the other industry in urban, the investment in agricultural specific assets 
becomes his or her loss. So, the more the tenant invests in agricultural specific assets, 
however, the easier the hold-up problem arises (Klein et al 1978). In order to avoid being 
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threatened by the land lessor who intends to increase the rent, tenant has to sign a formal 
contract. But the contracting activities will consume resources. The value of resources 
consumed for contracting is the contracting cost which is a part of transaction costs. So, the 
tenant‘s transaction costs include negotiation costs and contracting costs from investment in 
specific asset, which are supposed to be identical under contracts between external 
individuals and contracts between internal individuals (
incomplete complete
p pTC TC ). 
In terms of land lessor‘s transaction costs (
incomplete
lTC ), when contracts between 
external individuals (tenant is from outside the village) operate, these costs are negotiating 
costs only (
incomplete
lbc ), and then I obtain
incomplete incocmplete
l lTC bc . However, when contracts 
between internal individuals (both inside the same village) operate, lessor‘s transaction 
costs (
complete
lTC ) are composed of both negotiating (
complete
lbc ) and local community 
organization ( lcc ) costs. The local community organization costs regard land lessor‘s 
investment in forming good reputation within his or her residential village community and 
keeping healthy relationships (friendship and being neighborly) with other villagers by 
providing personal help, financial support, and communication (talking and sharing of 
emotions). Even when assuming that land lessors have grown up in the village and know 
other villagers well, as the environment around their village changes because of impact of 
urbanization, land lessors still have to incur costs to maintain knowledge about and 
relationships with others in the village. 
In this kind of network organization, it is easy for land lessor to monitor tenant‘s 
contracting activities. Hence, I consider farmland contracting within personal network as 
land lessor monitoring tenant‘s behavior under relatively complete information 
environment. In this case, however, the community organization costs to form and hold a 
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good personal connection network within the village community are higher. Outside the 
village, the land lessor does not spend any resources to invest in keeping relationship with 
other persons who are not from his or her personal connection network. In that case, the 
local community organization costs for land lessor are limited. Therefore, there are a great 
number of community costs when contracts between internal individuals operate under 
complete information, but the community costs approximately approach to zero when 
contracts between external individuals operate under incomplete information. It means that 
such community organization costs actually are land lessor‘s expense for making the 
information more complete. Because the land lessor‘s revenue under incomplete 
information is expressed as the area
EDJAS
, the land lessor‘s profits are 
incomplete incomplete
l EDJA lS bc   . To make land lessor‘s profits indifferent under different 
information structure, and complete complete
l EDBA l lS bc cc    denotes land lessor‘s profits 
under complete information. So, given land lessor‘s bargaining costs are identical 
(
incomplete complete
l lbc bc ) and profits are indifferent (
incomplete complete
l l  ) under different 
information structure, I derive that the land lessor‘s local community organization costs ( lcc ) 
are identical to the area
AJBS , which actually was considered as the economic waste by 
Cheung (1968).  
According to the property of the tenant‘s production 0


k
y
and 02
2



k
y
, let me 
assume that the production function can be expressed as   Kky ln , where 
kK ln and  denotes the exogenous variable with 0 mean value. So, 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )E y E K E K E E K K       . Following Stiglitz (1974), I use piecewise function 
to express the return to the tenant (s) based on a leasing contract either under a share or 
fixed-rent contract where a parameter (a) representing the fixed payment which corresponds 
to a=0 under share contract and to a<0 under fixed rent contract: 
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Following the model strategy from Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987), I assume tenant‘s 
production cost function is
 
2
2
1)(C KK 
 
and the coefficient of production cost 0 .  
4.3.2 Monitoring under Complete Information 
Now, the tenant‘s expected profit function under complete information is 
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Under complete information, the tenant‘s optimal input ratio ( 1k ) can be easily 
monitored by land lessor. So, in order to maximize the expected profits under complete 
information, land lessor can induce tenant to invest at his ideal level by negotiation. Then, 
the tenant‘s investment is contractually specified at an optimum level. In this case, the land 
lessor can successfully stipulate that the tenant invest up to 1k . Then, land lessor‘s expected 
profit maximum problem under complete information is： 
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2
    
complete
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It means that the tenant‘s expected profits from leasing farmland at least should be 
identical to his reservation income (Vc), because land lessor has to guarantee that tenant is 
willing to receive his or her offer. So, tenant‘s expected profit function becomes land 
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lessor‘s constraint condition of maximizing his or her expected profit, which is considered 
as the participation constraint. From (4.5), there should be a non-negative constant b 
satisfying that   𝑟     1
2
    
complete
pTC        , and then        
𝑟   1
2
    
complete
pTC       (The Kuhn-Tucker Method is discussed in 
AppendixC1).If I put (  ) into (4.4), then I will have： 
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The first order condition of equation (4.6) is as below: 
1
(1 ) 0
complete
f fl
k k
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        So, I obtain that 𝑟          
Hence, the land lessor‘s optimal share percentage 𝑟    satisfies the rent 
requirement for fixed-rent contract in formula (4.2), and it means that tenant obtains all 
residual claim income and land lessor receives the fixed rental income. Actually, as I have 
shown above, this optimal solution is based on the assumption of complete information 
between land lessor and tenant. The economic intuition of it is that under complete 
information, land lessor can obtain enough information referring to tenant‘s contractual 
enforcement. So, the land lessor is able to sign a contract with tenant to guarantee that land 
lessor can receive the fixed income from leasing farmland and tenant can obtain all of the 
residual claims, prior to the agricultural production. In that case, land lessor can 
unambiguously determine the amount of the fixed rental income, and tenant is encouraged 
to invest at land lessor‘s optimal target level by full residual claims. In Figure 4.2, k2 is the 
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optimal investment and then fixed-rent contract is the optimal arrangement under such 
information structure. Now, the equilibrium point is B, under complete information. 
According to this logic, given the complete information, a fixed-rent contract will be 
preferred by land lessor. 
Implication 1 Under complete information, land lessor chooses fixed-rent contract as the 
optimal institutional arrangement.  
In order to apply this proposition into the real case of farmland lease experiment in the 
empirical section, I consider the farmer who leases his or her right to using farmland 
represents the land lessor in my model and the internal individuals that lease in the right to 
use from the former within lessor‘s village (including neighbor, relatives, internal small 
farms, and internal large farms) represents the tenants under complete information in above 
model. Compared with collecting information regarding external individuals involving 
external small farms, external large farms, cooperatives, and agricultural corporations 
outside lessor‘s village, the land lessor relatively has more information about his or her 
neighbor, relatives and other farms within his or her own village. It means that land lessor 
can easily monitor the contractual performing activities of internal individuals. If the 
internal individual is supposed to be the tenant under complete information, according to 
this logic, I derive the first hypothesis from implication 1: 
Hypothesis 1 Land lessor prefers to lease the right to using farmland to internal individuals 
by fixed-rent contract. 
4.3.3 Monitoring under Incomplete Information 
Basically, the tenet of implication one is that fixed-rent contract is optimal choice 
where information is complete. To the extent that information is incomplete, land lessor 
cannot efficiently induce tenant invest at land lessor‘s ideal level under fixed-rent contract, 
because it is difficult for land lessor to precisely measure tenant‘s inputs and determine the 
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amount of rental income before tenant‘s cultivation. Therefore, fixed-rent contract cannot 
achieve land lessor‘s profit maximization.  
According to Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987), when land lessor is not able to monitor 
tenant‘s contractual performing, tenant can determine his or her ideal k (and K) to 
maximize his or her expected profits. So, given tenant‘s transaction costs are the same 
regardless of the structure of information (
incomplete complete
p pTC TC ), then the tenant‘s expected 
profit function under incomplete information is 
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Therefore, the first order condition of tenant‘s expected profit function above is： 
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That is as below： 
   
  𝑟
 
                        
That is the second constraint condition for land lessor to encourage tenant to 
contribute investment into agricultural production under incomplete information, which is 
supposed as the incentive compatibility constraint. Although land lessor cannot determine 
tenant‘s investment by contracts, he or she is still able to bargain with tenant on the rental 
sharing percentage (r), which can be specified on the contract under incomplete information. 
So, under incomplete information, land lessor can successfully stipulate his or her optimal 
sharing percentage. Hence, along with equation (4.4), land lessor‘s optimal problem 
becomes as below： 
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From (4.10), there should be a non-negative constant d satisfying that   𝑟      
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So, the first order condition of equation (4.11) is as following: 
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The solution is that 𝑟    ∫
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Hence, under incomplete information, the land lessor‘s optimal share percentage 
𝑟     satisfies the rent requirement of share contract in formula (4.2), and it means that 
tenant and land lessor both acquire one part of residual claim income under share contract. 
The optimal solution is equilibrium A in Figure 4.2, which assumes incomplete information 
between land lessor and tenant. It implies that it is difficult for the land lessor to observe 
tenant‘s contractual enforcement, so the former cannot efficiently specify the latter‘s 
investment and precisely determine the amount of rental income, under incomplete 
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information. In that case, however, they can still make an agreement regarding the rental 
share percentage by share contract. The residual claim can be divided and allocated to the 
contracting parties according to the share percentage. Sharing tenancy can also play a vital 
role for incentive the land lessor and the tenant to perform the contract, under incomplete 
information. So, I derive the second implication as below: 
Implication 2 The share contract is the best choice for land lessor under incomplete 
information. 
It means that if the share percentage is greater than zero, and then the tenant‘s 
investment (such as k1 in Figure 4.2) under incomplete information is less than that under 
complete information (k2), because the share contract provides tenant just a part of residual 
claims but the fixed-rent contract provides tenant full residual claims, resulting in the total 
agricultural production under share contract is less than that under fixed-rent contract. 
However, land lessor does not need to take the responsibility for the local community 
organization costs under incomplete information, so share contract is chosen to reduce such 
a great deal of transaction costs. Based on this logic, if the information becomes incomplete, 
fixed-rent contract will be replaced by share contract for reducing transaction costs. 
Therefore, share contract is efficient under incomplete information. This result is consistent 
with the theoretical findings from Newbery (1977) and Hallagan (1978), and is supported 
by the empirical results from Ackerberg and Botticini (2000) and Bellemare (2012), which 
are based on the postulate of risk aversion, but my model does not need such assumption. 
Similarly, in order to apply this proposition into the real case of farmland lease 
experiment below, I consider the external individuals that lease in the right to use from the 
land lessor outside the latter‘s village (including external small farms, external large farms, 
cooperatives, and agricultural corporations) represents the tenants under incomplete 
information in my model. Because compared with acquiring knowledge about the internal 
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individuals, the land lessor relatively has less information about the external individuals 
outside his or her own village. If the external individual is supposed to be the tenant under 
incomplete information, according to this logic, I derive the second hypothesis from 
implication 2: 
Hypothesis 2 Land lessor prefers to lease the right to using farmland to external individuals 
by share contract. 
 
4.4 Empirical Tests 
 
4.4.1 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
I use the survey data from the Project of National Natural Science Foundation in China 
on the topic of farmland lease deregulation and Cantonese agricultural organization location 
game mechanism. The survey collected information from 547 rural households in Canton of 
China from January 2015 to March 2015. The main part of questionnaire is attached in the 
appendix C3. 
The target population of the survey is farm households associated with farmland 
leasing businesses in 16 representative cites located in Canton of China (see Table 4.1). The 
selection of research sites for this survey was based on clustering analysis of five indicators 
(total population, per capita GDP, total area of farmland, agricultural population, and share 
of agricultural output). Finally, 16 representative cites within Guangdong (Canton) 
province were selected. The survey collects data from cross sectional data with 547 
farmland lease observations from 600 households in 60 villages, so the effective sample 
rate is about 91.2%. Table 4.1 provides summary statistics of farmland contract samples 
distribution across the 16 cities.  
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Table 4.1 shows that the number of farmers (349) who choose fixed-rent contract is 
greater than that of farmers choosing share contract (198). The highest proportion of 
farmers choosing fixed-rent contract occurs in Shaoguan (92.5%), the north of Canton, and 
in Maoming (89.19%), the west of Canton; that of farmers choosing sharing contract 
appears in Qingyuan (69.23%) and Zhongshan (62.5%), the pearl river delta of Canton.  
Table 4. 1: Summary Statistics of Farmland Contract Samples Distribution 
City 
Fixed-Rent Contract Share Contract Total 
Number  Percentage (%) Number  Percentage (%) Number Percentage (%) 
Shanwei 20 50% 20 50% 40 7.31% 
Zhuhai 17 77.27% 5 22.73% 22 4.02% 
Meizhou 27 67.5% 13 32.5% 40 7.31% 
Huizhou 14 43.75% 18 56.25% 32 5.85% 
Maoming 33 89.19% 4 10.81% 37 6.76% 
Heyuan 29 76.32% 9 23.68% 38 6.95% 
Chaojiu 33 82.5% 7 17.5% 40 7.31% 
Zhongshan 15 37.5% 25 62.5% 40 7.31% 
Jieyang 23 60.53% 15 39.47% 38 6.95% 
Shaoguan 37 92.5% 3 7.5% 40 7.31% 
Qingyuan 12 30.77% 27 69.23% 39 7.13% 
Yangjiang 33 86.84% 5 13.16% 38 6.95% 
Zhanjiang 22 59.46% 15 40.54% 37 6.76% 
Yangjiang 33 86.84% 5 13.16% 38 6.95% 
Guangzhou 20 50% 20 50% 40 7.31% 
Zhaoqing 14 53.85% 12 46.15% 26 4.75% 
Total 349 63.8% 198 36.2% 547 100% 
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Table 4. 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Item  Variable  Coding Mean Max Min S.D 
Dependent 
Variable 
contractualtype 1= Fixed-Rent Contract,0= Share 
Contract 0.638 1 0 0.4810 
Independent 
Variables 
informationstructure 1= farmland is leased to farmers, farms, 
agricultural corporations and 
cooperatives outside the subject‘s 
village, 0= farmland is leased to 
relatives, neighbors, farmers, farms, 
agricultural corporations and 
cooperatives in the same village with 
the subject 
0.7659 1 0 0.4237 
 
 
popularname 1=land lessor‘s family name is 
seldom,2= land lessor‘s family is not 
seldom and not common, 3= land 
lessor‘s family name is common 
2.5192 3 1 0.7419 
neighborhood 1=none relative and friend,2=a few of 
relatives and friends, 3= many relatives 
and friends 
2.4351 3 1 0.5998 
publicpension 1=purchase governmental 
insurance,0=no 
0.3784 1 0 0.4854 
privateinsurance 1=purchase commercial insurance,0=no 0.0439 1 0 0.2050 
farmlandreadjustment 1=farmland has not been readjusted in 5 
years,2=part of farmland has been 
readjusted in 5 years, 3=all farmland has 
been readjusted in 5 years 
1.1938 3 1 0.5437 
agriculturalincome share of agricultural income to total 
household income*100% 
29.10 100 0 32.38   
contracting 1= oral agreement, 2=paper contract not 
recognized by court,3=formal contract 
recognized by court 
2.6782 3 1 0.6309 
farmlandtitling 1= titling on specific land area and share 
of land in rural land stock cooperative 
system, 2= titling on specific land area, 
3= titling on share of land in rural land 
stock cooperative system, 4= under the 
process of titling, 5= none 
2.1243 5 1 1.3407 
Notes: 1) popularname represents land lessor‘s blood relationship within the village community. Especially for the village 
in Canton of China, most of members in the same village have the same family name, because they have the same 
ancestors. It means that land lessors and tenants who have the same family name are probably relatives in the same village. 
Hence, if the land lessor‘s family name is common in his or her village, then the probability that land lessor leases right to 
using farmland to internal individuals by fixed-rent contract is higher, according to implication 1.  
2) The number of relatives and friends represents the land lessor‘s friendship status in the village community. When land 
lessor has many relatives and friends in his or her village, he or she has a good relationship with other village members 
and easily forms an efficient private network that reduces contracting costs if the farmland is leased within that network. 
So, the probability that land lessor leases right to using farmland to internal individuals by fixed-rent contract is higher 
under the condition that land lessor owns a well-organized social connection capital, according to implication 1.  
3) The core of Chinese farmland policy is the coexistence of individual land-use rights with village-level land ownership. 
Individual rights are intended to motivate farmers to invest in land, while village-level ownership allows officials to 
reallocate that land periodically and impose other land use adjustments (Zhang et al. 2011). In order to keep equity in the 
village of Chinese, the right to using farmland is reallocated by the village officials each five years, according to the 
village population and of village member‘s family size (Mullan et al. 2011).  
4) farmlandtitling is a form of farmland reform in China where rural household and families are given formal user rights 
of farmland with legal permits by the village government (Li 2012). Titling on specific land area means the information 
about the location and area of farmer‘s land is included in the permit clearly. Titling on share of land in rural land stock 
cooperative system means that the information about the location and area of the land is not included in the permit, so the 
information is ambiguous, but the share percentage of the village land is converted to the stock in the rural land stock 
cooperative system and the share percentage of land stock is involved in the permit. 
5) The insurance purchase status represents the subject‘s risk attitude. 
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Table 4.2 presents summary statistics for each of the variables in the analysis. As 
shown in Table 4.2, contractual choice (contractualtype) is the main explanatory variable (I 
define it as 1 given the fixed-rent contract and as 0 given sharing contract). Information 
structure is taken as the main explanatory variable: I define ―informationstructure‖ as 0 if 
farmland is leased to internal individuals, others as 1, according to the implication one and 
two in theoretical section. According to the sample, 23.41% farmland is leased to internal 
individuals and 76.59% farmland is leased to external individuals. Most of local farmers in 
Canton prefer to migrate to urban and lease their farmland to the external individuals who 
usually come from the north of Canton such as Hunan Province (He 2019). So, the 
farmland in Canton is mainly leased to external individuals, which is the result of the local 
rural population urbanization (Lai et al. 2017) 
 
4.4.2 Econometric Methodology 
(1) Binary Dependent Variable Regression: Logit Model 
To empirically estimate the choice of contracts, I set up a binary regression model with 
a vector of exogenous explanatory X (informationstructure, popularname, neighborhood, 
publicpension, privateinsurance, agriculturalincome, farmlandreadjustment, contracting, 
farmlandtitling), a random disturbance term    and dependent variable 
𝑐   𝑟 𝑐     𝑦    {
    𝑥   𝑟    𝑐   𝑟 𝑐 
                  𝑟  𝑐   𝑟 𝑐    
. 
So, the probability model of choosing fixed-rent contract for farmer i  is expressed as 
follows: 
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where F     is the logistic distribution function of   . So the probability model 
specification of share contractual choice for the i
th
 farmer can now be written as:  
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From (4.15), 
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    and then the natural logarithm of relative odds is 
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            . 
Since I cannot interpret the parameters of probability model directly, I can use 
marginal effect of parameters for estimation. For the farmer i, the marginal effect of a 
change in the kth independent variable on the probability that the farmer i chooses 
fixed-rent contract as follow. 
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where
'(.)e eF f  is the probability intensity function.
  (2) Propensity Score Matching (PSM) 
A Logit Model regression may yield selection bias if unobservable farmer behavior 
and psychology characteristics (e.g., individual value preference, community common 
beliefs, and so on) influence farmland being leased to internal individuals. This may arise 
from farmer self-selection for leasing farmland to internal individuals, resulting in an 
endogenous problem. Therefore, estimation of Logit Model will lead to biased estimates. 
The propensity score matching method, however, solves for selection bias by estimating a 
counterfactual outcome for a control group with similar attributes with a treatment group 
(Pan 2014). 
In principle, the impact on contractual choice of the information structure is as below: 
For farmer i , with i=1, ,547 , I follow Abadie and Imbens (2006) and let 
0icontractualtype  and 1icontractualtype  denote the two potential outcomes given lessors 
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who lease to internal lessees ( 0iinformationstructure  ) considered the control group 
and lessors who lease to external lessees ( 1iinformationstructure  ) as the treatment group.  
The variable iinformationstructure , with  0,1iinformationstructure  , indicates the 
treatment is received or not such that  0iinformationstructure   represents complete 
information or farmland leased to internal individuals as controlled group and 
1iinformationstructure  represents incomplete information or farmland leased to external 
individuals as treated group.  The basic idea of PSM is to match treatment lessors who 
lease to external individuals with control lessors who lease to internal individuals and have 
similar attributes with the treatment group individuals.  
For farmer i , I observe iinformationstructure  and the outcomes for this treatment,
1
0
0, 1
1, 0
i i
i
i i
contractualtype informationstructure
contrac
if
i
tualtype
contractualtype informationstructuref
 
 
 
as well as a vector of 
covariates, denoted by iX . My main focus is on the average treatment effect for the treated 
(ATT). 
Controlling for endogenous matching has an impact on parameters of interest, and 
tenants' risk aversion appears to have influenced contract choice (Ackerberg and Botticini, 
2001). According to that literature, I address this endogenous matching problem using PSM 
on farmland contracts.  
So, the average treatment effect for the treated (ATT) estimation with propensity score 
(       [i      ti   t u tu   |  ]   𝑟[i      ti   t u tu     |  ]) is: 
    
    E[𝑐   𝑟 𝑐     𝑦     𝑐   𝑟 𝑐     𝑦    |i      ti   t u tu     ] 
 E{E[𝑐   𝑟 𝑐     𝑦     𝑐   𝑟 𝑐     𝑦    |      i      ti   t u tu   
  ]|i      ti   t u tu     } 
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 E{E[𝑐   𝑟 𝑐     𝑦    |      i      ti   t u tu     ]
 E[𝑐   𝑟 𝑐     𝑦    |      i      ti   t u tu   
  ]|i      ti   t u tu     }  
Under the conditional independence assumption (CIA), I obtain 
E[𝑐   𝑟 𝑐     𝑦    |      i      ti   t u tu     ] 
 E[𝑐   𝑟 𝑐     𝑦    |      i      ti   t u tu     ] (4.19) 
      Equation (4.19) means that the distributions of potential outcomes between the 
treated and the controlled groups are the same, with the same covariates. So, the 
expectation values are identical. The left-hand side of (4.19) represents the counterfactual 
outcome of the treatment group, which is unobserved. The right-hand of (4.19) represents 
the observed outcome of the control group. Then I can use the observable outcome of the 
control group as the estimation of the counterfactual outcome of the treated. Therefore,  
    
    E{E[𝑐   𝑟 𝑐     𝑦    |      i      ti   t u tu     ]
 E[𝑐   𝑟 𝑐     𝑦    |      i      ti   t u tu   
  ]|i      ti   t u tu     }
 E{E[𝑐   𝑟 𝑐     𝑦   |      i      ti   t u tu     ]
 E[𝑐   𝑟 𝑐     𝑦   |      i      ti   t u tu   
  ]|i      ti   t u tu     }          
    Hence, (4.20) is the average difference between the average outcome of the treated 
(farmland leased to external individuals) and average outcome of the controlled (farmland 
leased to internal individuals), given the treatment. Generally speaking, there are various 
matching propensity scores algorithms, asymptotically, all matching methods should yield 
the same results (Stuart 2010). However, in practice, there are trade-offs in terms of bias 
and efficiency with each method (Todd 1999). In order to design one to one matching 
experiment to guarantee the causal effect above, I utilize nearest neighbor matching 
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approach (Heckman et al 1998). 
 
4.5 Empirical Results 
 
4.5.1 Estimation by Logit Model 
Table 4.3 reports estimation results for the Logit Model. A negative regression 
coefficient means that an increase in the explanatory variable is associated with decreased 
probability of choosing a fixed-rent contract. Before expounding on the results, it is worth 
mentioning that the estimated model demonstrated a good predictive capability as indicated 
by McFadden pseudo-R
2
 value of 0.2759, because it is far less than 1. 
Turning my attention to the coefficient estimates in Table 4.3, the informationstructure 
coefficient has a negative and significant effect on the choice of fixed-rent contract. The 
marginal effect of -0.1361 suggests that when farmland is leased to an external individual, 
the farmer is 13.61% to less likely to lease out farmland by fixed-rent lease contract 
compared to a share contract. It means that the farmer is more likely to lease out farmland 
by share contract, if the farmland is leased to an external individual. This result is consistent 
with hypothesis two. 
Results in Table 4.3 also show that 1% increase in the agricultural income ratio 
(agriculturalincome) is 0.52% more likely to lease farmland by fixed-rent contract. The 
agricultural income ratio reflects the degree to which agriculture is the primary revenue 
source for the land lessor. The higher the agricultural income ratio, the more the land lessor 
depends on agricultural land for income. It means that the lessor with higher agricultural 
income ratio is more likely to work and stay in his or her village, instead of to migrate 
outside the village and work in non-agricultural industry (Zou and Luo 2018). Therefore, 
lessors who are farmers are more likely to lease farmland by fixed-rent contract. 
Conversely with a lower agricultural income ratio, a land lessor is less able to monitor the 
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tenant easily, given he or she has likely migrated outside his or her own village for 
non-agricultural work. In that case, most of his or her income comes from non-agricultural 
production. Hence, with lower agricultural income ratio, land lessor is more likely to lease 
farmland under a share contract. Thus, this result supports the hypothesis one in the 
theoretical section. 
Finally, Table 4.3 reveals that the farmer who has experience with large scale of 
readjustment of farmland in the last five years is about 10.04% more likely to choose 
fixed-rent contract (marginal effect in Table 4.3). Further, the coefficient on choosing 
fixed-rent contract is positive and significant at the 10% level of significance. This result 
suggests that when property rights of farmland are unstable, farmer is more likely to lease 
farmland by fixed-rent contract, so as to guarantee that a fixed-rental income will be 
obtained and reduce the impact from farmland readjustment (Zou et al. 2018). 
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Table 4. 3: Regression Results for Logit Model (Dependent Variable: contractualtype) 
Variable coefficient marginal effect 
informationstructure -0.8430** 
(0.3987) 
-0.1361** 
(0.0643) 
popularname 0.3174 
(0.2744) 
0.0512 
(0.0435) 
neighborhood -0.055 
(0.2474) 
-0.0090 
(0.0399) 
publicpension -0.2875 
(0.3989) 
-0.0464 
(0.0645) 
privatepension 0.3201 
(0.8817) 
0.0517 
(0.1420) 
farmlandreadjustment 0.6221* 
(0.3685) 
0.1004* 
(0.0589) 
agriculturalincome 0.0323*** 
(0.0089) 
0.0052*** 
(0.0012) 
contracting -0.0959 
(0.3100) 
-0.0154 
(0.0500) 
farmlandtitling -0.019 
(0.1316) 
-0.0030 
(0.0212) 
constant -1.4633 
(1.9147) 
 
Pseudo R
2
 0.2759  
Observations 547 547 
Note: 1) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; 2) Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 
4.5.2 Extension by PSM 
As shown the PSM methodology section, in order to conduct the Nearest Neighbor 
Matching (Caliendo and Kopenig 2008), especially for one to one matching with 
replacement (Pan, 2014), I examine the impact of information structure on farmland 
contractual choice behavior with NNM in Table 4.4.  
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Table 4. 4: Estimates of the Average Treatment Effect for Treatment Variable (ATT) 
Matching 
Status 
Number of 
External 
Individuals 
Number of 
Internal 
Individuals 
Total 
Observations 
Probability 
of 
Choosing 
Fixed-rent 
Contract 
by External 
Individuals 
Probability 
of 
Choosing 
Fixed-rent 
Contract 
by Internal 
Individuals 
Difference 
or ATT 
t-stat 
 
Before 
Matching 
 
419 
 
128 
 
547 
 
0.6574 
 
0.6111 
 
0.0463 
 
0.82 
 
After 
Matching 
 
216 108 324 0.6536 0.8040 -0.1504 -1.83* 
Note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Before matching, the probabilities of treated group (lessors leasing to external 
individuals) and controlled group (lessors leasing to internal individuals) choosing 
fixed-rent contract are 0.6574 and 0.6111, respectively. It means that 65.74% of the 419 
external individuals choosing fixed-rent contract, while 61.11% of the 128 internal 
individuals choosing fixed-rent contract, which implies that 34.26% of the 419 external 
individuals choosing share contract, while 38.89% of the 128 internal individuals choosing 
share contract, before matching. And the probability of a fixed-rent contract by the 
treatment group is greater than that of control group by 0.0463. This difference, however, is 
not statistically significant. Matching is a method to design an experiment under a 
randomized tries environment in which the selection bias will be solved. So, I pay more 
attention on the empirical results by matching. 
Again, Table 4.4 shows that after matching, the probabilities of treated group (lessors 
leasing to external individuals) and controlled group (lessors leasing to internal individuals) 
choosing fixed-rent contract are 0.6536 and 0.8040, respectively. It means that 65.36% of 
the 216 external individuals responding chose fixed-rent contract, while 80.40% of the 108 
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internal individuals responding chose fixed-rent contract, which implies that 34.64% of the 
216 external individuals responding chose share contract, while 19.60% of the 108 internal 
individuals responding chose share contract, after matching. Moreover, ATT changes from 
0.0463 to -0.1504 and the t-stat becomes significant at a 10% level after matching, 
implying that after matching, the probability of the treatment group is less than that of the 
control group by 0.1504. The NNM indicates that farmland being leased to external 
individuals under incomplete information has a negative impact on fixed-rent contractual 
choice behavior, which is consistent with hypothesis 2. This result also means when 
selection bias is not accounted for there is estimation bias about causal effect of information 
structure on farmland contractual choice. Hence, after considering farmer‘s contractual 
selection bias, information structure impacts farmland contractual choice significantly.  
To check the stability of the propensity score matching results, kernel density test 
using the NNM are shown in Appendix C2. The result of this test shows that the difference 
in kernel density between lessor leasing to external individuals and lessors leasing to 
internal individuals groups after matching becomes much smaller than before matching. 
Before matching, there are significant differences in the characteristics between these two 
groups, so the propensity score curve of the treated departs from propensity score curve of 
the controlled. After matching, they are overlapping, which means that the differences in 
the characteristics between these groups have been balanced. These two overlapping curves 
imply that the attributes between the treated and the controlled are similar. So, it means that 
the PSM satisfies the balancing requirement by kernel density test. 
 
4.6 Conclusions 
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This research examines whether the informational structure between tenants and land 
lessors impacts farmland leasing contractual choice. The theoretic model results show that: 
(1) under complete information, a farmland lessor prefers a fixed-rent contract as the 
optimal institutional arrangement; and (2) a share contract will be the optimal choice for a 
farmland lessor under incomplete information. Furthermore, if I consider the farmer who 
leases farmland to an internal individual from lessor‘s village represents a land lessor under 
complete information, then this lessor prefers a fixed-rent contract. In contrast, if I consider 
the farmer who leases farmland to an external individual (one outside a lessor‘s village) as a 
land lessor under incomplete information, then this lessor prefers to lease the right to using 
farmland through a share contract. 
Empirical testing of this theoretical model with a Logit Model confirms that when land 
lessor engages in a farmland lease contract with an external individual, there is a negative 
and statistically significant effect on being likely to choose a fixed-rent contract. The test of 
propensity score matching (PSM) confirms the presence of estimation bias from sample 
self-selection between lessors who lease to internal individuals versus and lessors who lease 
to external individuals, so PSM approach utilized simulates the effect of randomization 
trials. It implies that the PSM with nearest-neighbor is suitable, which is consistent with the 
canonical model of sharecropping by making the strength of the land lessor‘s property right 
increasing in the amount of risk she bears within the contract (Bellemare, 2009). 
The theory of contractual choice under different information structure developed in 
this research may also be extended to other leasing arrangements. Share and fixed-rent 
contracts are observed not only in farmland, but also are common among farm machinery 
rentals.  However, the attributes between farmland and farm machine are different. For 
example, the quality of farmland is different when the land leased by tenant in different 
location, while the quality of farm machine is roughly the same even though it is used in 
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different places. For example, when farmland quality is very low, landlord would choose 
sharing contract to exposure risk, so sharing contract is designed for risk sharing 
partnerships (He et al. 2018). Of course, when the attributes of subjects differ, 
modifications need to be made in the theory of information structure to interpret contractual 
choice in these fields. Finally, more formal analyses of the choice of contractual 
arrangements involved wage contract and of subject‘s other attributes (such as quality of 
land or ability of labor) is needed (He et al. 2018).  
. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusions 
 
This study has analyzed the environmental pollution, electricity consumption and 
farmland contractual choice in China by: (1) assessing the impacts of environmental 
pollution and institutional abatement targets on real average housing prices across China, (2) 
deriving a metropolitan electricity consumption function under electricity demand 
management reform, and (3) determining optimal farmland leasing contractual choice under 
different informational structures.  
The nation of China is the world's largest source of sulfur dioxide emissions. The 
objective of the first essay is to examine the effects of sulfur dioxide emissions and 
institutional abatement targets on real average housing prices in China. Three econometric 
models are used to investigate these effects: Fixed Effects, Spatial Fixed Effects, and 
Spatial Difference-In-Difference. The contributions of this chapter are: (1) providing a 
theoretical framework for the impacts of environmental pollution and SO2 institutional 
abatement targets on real average housing prices, (2) designing an institutional experiment 
integrated with spatial factors to assess the impact of institutional abatement targets on real 
average housing prices, and (3) distinguishing and examining both water and air pollution 
impacts on housing prices. 
This framework reveals that both types of environment pollution have negative impacts 
on real average housing prices. In addition, the empirical results confirm the theoretical 
expectations for SO2 emissions and discharges for industrial wastewater using both Fixed 
Effects and Spatial Fixed Effects Models. The empirical results from institutional 
experiment also demonstrate that the institutional abatement targets increase real average 
housing price during the Eleventh Five-Year Plan in China. Based on the empirical results, 
I can conclude that the impact of air pollution is greater than the impact of water pollution.  
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Electricity use is vitally important for a developing metropolitan. In the second essay, 
the purpose is to investigate the effect of economic output combining electricity demand 
management reform on electricity consumption by setting up an optimal control model and 
deriving a basic electricity consumption function. The research contributions include: (1) 
use of an inter-temporal total income optimization model that connects electricity 
consumption to economic output and consumption habits, which has not been examined 
previously in the literature, and (2) design of a natural experiment using kink regression 
discontinuity approach to investigate the effect of the 1985 electricity demand management 
reform that occurred in Guangzhou on electricity consumption.  
Based on the theoretical hypothesis, the empirical results demonstrate three findings: (1) 
a unidirectional Granger causality running from economic output to electricity consumption; 
(2) previous electricity consumption habits have a ―path dependent‖ effect on current 
electricity consumption; and (3) given the electricity demand management reform, 
economic output drives up the electricity consumption, but at a lower rate than prior to 
reform–indicating possible efficient improvements in electricity usage. 
For the third essay, the research objective is to examine the effect of information 
structure on the farmland contractual choice behavior. Farmland was not allowed to be 
leased before the 1978 agricultural system reform in China. Therefore, the farmland lease 
contractual choice behavior is considered as a case study of land lessor and tenant choices 
occurring after reform in rural China. The contributions of this essay are: (1) the 
assumption of private ownership in Cheung (1968)‘s tenancy theory is shown not to be 
needed and transaction costs are integrated into the theoretical model of contractual choice; 
and (2) the moral hazard model (Stiglitz 1974) separates from conventional tax-equivalent 
approach, but I obtain new solution by combining principal-agent model and revised 
tax-equivalent approach. The findings are that share contract is inefficient under complete 
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information, but this type of contract is the optimal choice under incomplete information. 
Empirical evidence from Canton, China is provided to support the theoretical hypotheses 
above by use of the Matching Propensity Score method. Finally, based on the theoretical 
implications in this study, given incomplete information, a share contract will be preferred 
by the land lessor.  
The results of theoretic models derived that: (1) under complete information, land 
lessor chooses fixed-rent contract as the optimal institutional arrangement; and (2) share 
contract will be considered as the best choice for land lessor under incomplete information. 
Furthermore, I consider that the farmer who leases his or her farmland represents the land 
lessor in my model and the internal individual who leases in the right to use farmland from 
a land lessor within lessor‘s village represents the tenant under complete information in my 
model. The land lessor, in this case of an internal individual as a tenant, prefers a fixed-rent 
contract. In contrast, when an external individual (one outside a lessor‘s village) is the 
tenant leasing in farmland, this lessor and tenant relationship is a share contract under 
incomplete information. As a result, the land lessor prefers to lease the right to using 
farmland to external individuals by share contract. 
As a concluding remark linking all three essays, each one involves the development of 
econometric model which utilize methods to incorporate an institutional change experiment 
involving regulatory reform. These methods by experimental econometrics are less prone to 
specification errors than standard methods involving selection bias (Angrist and Pischke 
2008). Because the former makes the empirical research be closed to randomized trial. For 
example, matching method in Chapter 4 is considered as a stratified randomized experiment: 
each farmer who leases land to external individuals finds (at least) one from internal 
individuals equal in covariates. It means that the population of farmers is divided into 
different groups randomly. Furthermore, in terms of the panel data in Chapter 2, fixed 
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effects or difference in difference strategy actually is an incremental stratified randomized 
experiment, so it is a typical design for natural experiment. Finally, the regression 
discontinuity approach is the most closed to complete randomized experiment: the 
individual is not able to control the cut-off, so the data around the cut-off (or kink point in 
Chapter 3) are highly similar. Near cut-off, whether the data belongs to the left-hand side or 
right-hand side is completely determined by uncontrolled random factors. Therefore, the 
assignment of treatment can be considered as a complete randomized experiment. 
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Appendix A 
Appendix A1 
 
Figure A 1: Time Trend of Natural Logarithmic of Real Average Housing Prices in Sample 
Provinces of China (1998-2015) 
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Appendix A2 
 
Figure A 2: Time Trend of Natural Logarithmic of Discharges of Industrial Wastewater Per 
Capita in Sample Provinces of China (1998-2015) 
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Appendix A3 
 
Figure A 3: Time Trend of Natural Logarithmic of Sulfur Dioxide Emissions Per Capita in 
Sample Provinces of China (1998-2015) 
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Appendix A4 
Table A 1: Results of Panel Unit Root Test (Levin-Lin-Chu) 
 
Variable Statistics P value 
lnRAHP -3.8771*** 0.0001 
lnWW -2.7734*** 0.0028 
lnSO2 -8.2299*** 0.0000 
lnBC -6.7486*** 0.0001 
lnUR -84.0679*** 0.0000 
lnI -8.7403*** 0.0000 
Note: 1) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix B 
Appendix B1 
This appendix provides a derivation of equation (3.10).  This derivation starts with the 
current Hamiltonian Function from the optimal control problem in equation (3.9): 
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   ε  𝐷  F  
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   ε  𝐷  F  
   
  C        ]
  
 
   
      G   F      B   
where    is the shadow price of capital at year t and    is the shadow price of stock of 
electricity infrastructure at year t. The Pontryagin necessary conditions (PNC) are as below: 
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From (B2), I obtain:                  B   
From (B4), I obtain: 
[  (
 
   
)    ]  A   
     ε  𝐷  F  
   
  (
 
   
)      (
 
   
)        
According to the condition that each profit maximizing firm should hire any input up 
to the point at which the input‘s marginal contribution to production is equal to the marginal 
cost of hiring any input, I assume that there are n units of homogeneous firms in the 
metropolitan, so        and       , where    and    denote each firm‘s output 
and capital input at year t, respectively. Hence, each firm‘s marginal productivity of capital 
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should be identical to the interest rate that is supposed to be social discount rate (  
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According to the general solution of the first order difference equation, I get 
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where W is an initial value in the solution of the first order difference equation of   , so it 
is a constant. Based on (B6), I get 
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Furthermore, from (B3), I obtain 
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Plug (B6), (B7) into (B8), I obtain:  
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According to the transfer relationship between electricity capacity and electricity 
consumptionE   F ε  𝐷  , plug (B9) into it, I obtain the optimal electricity function  
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, then the metropolitan electricity 
consumption function can be expressed as:     𝑌 . Therefore, 
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where           and  𝜖     ε  𝐷   .       
    𝑌  means that expected income is 
assumed to be linearly associated with current income (    
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), which is supported by 
the evidence from Campbell and Mankiw (1990). 
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In terms of equation (3.20), current electricity consumption is dependent on indirectly 
determined by consumers‘ income to be spent on purchasing appliance in the future. The 
values of durable goods are relatively higher and the life span of them is longer than that of 
nondurable goods. Therefore, I use the expectation of income to purchase durable items that 
use electricity (Modigliani 1985). Appliances are durable goods, so consumers must utilize 
electricity to create consumption. Therefore, the appliance consumption is determined by 
consumer‘s future income and then electricity consumption is indirectly associated to 
consumer‘s expectation income. Based on this logic, if I estimate electricity consumption 
function, and then I suppose the natural log of metropolitan electricity consumption at year 
t      can also the linear function of expectation of the natural log of real GDP      
  , 
time trend t and error term 𝜖 . 
Furthermore, according to the theory of rational expectation (Muth 1961), let     
  be 
the expectation value composed of natural log of current real GDP (    ) and expectation 
of natural log of previous real GDP (      
 ): 
    
                   
      B    
So, plug (B12) into (B11), electricity consumption function can be express like this: 
             [                 
 ]  𝜖   B    
According to equation (B12), I obtain: 
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Plug (B14) and (B15) into (B12): 
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Plug (B16) into (B13): 
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Hence, from (B19), the reduced form of metropolitan electricity consumption is 
     [            ]                       𝜖  –  𝜖     
               E         (B20) 
where                ,           ,      and    𝜖  –  𝜖    
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  ε  𝐷   . Equation (3.29) means that the current electricity consumption is determined by 
the previous electricity consumption and the current real GDP, and other factors in error 
term. Here, previous electricity consumption can be considered as the electricity 
consumption habits (Carroll et al. 1996). 
Finally, if I assume      ε  𝐷      𝐷  𝑣 , where 𝑣  denotes the unobservable 
factors excluding electricity demand management reform, then the electricity consumption 
function is as below: 
                   E      𝐷  𝑣    B    
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Appendix B2 
 
 
Figure B 1:  Relationship Plots between Outcome Variable and Assignment Variable 
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Table B 1: VECM Granger Causality Analysis from 1949 to1985 
Dependent  
variable 
Wald statistics 
Short run Long run 
ΣΔ lnY t − 1 ΣΔlnE t − 1 ECT t − 1 
ΔlnYt - 0.4918  
(0.4831) 
0.0446  
(0.8327) 
[0.0103] 
ΔlnEt 1.607654 
( 0.2048) 
- 9.8158*** 
(0.0017) 
[-0.3813] 
Note: 1) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; 2) Values in parenthesis are p-values; 3) Values in square brackets 
are estimated coefficients of ECTt − 1. 
 
 
Table B 2: VECM Granger Causality Analysis from 1986 to 2016 
Dependent  
variable 
Wald statistics 
Short run Long run 
ΣΔ lnY t − 1 ΣΔlnE t − 1 ECT t − 1 
ΔlnYt - 0.109459  
(0.7328) 
0.6560  
(0.4179) 
[0.1882] 
ΔlnEt 0.001906 
( 0.9957) 
- 5.0499** 
(0.0246) 
[-0.6372] 
Note: 1) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; 2) Values in parenthesis are p-values; 3) Values in square brackets 
are estimated coefficients of ECTt − 1. 
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Appendix C 
Appendix C1 
1. Monitoring under Complete Information 
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Hence, it means that (4.5) is a binding constraint and b=0 in (4.6), and then there is no 
corner solution in this optimization problem. If I put (  ) into (4.4), then I will have： 
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Hence, it means (4.10) is a binding constraint and d=0 in (4.11), and then there is no corner 
solution in this optimization problem. If I put (4.8) and      into (4.9), then I will obtain： 
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Appendix C2 
 
Table C 1: Variables Differences in Means of Treated Group and Controlled Group Before 
Matching 
Variables 
External Individuals Internal Individuals Difference 
T-stats Mean SD Mean SD 
popularname 2.5179 0.0359 2.5234 0.0674 0.0738 
neighborhood 2.4319 0.0295 2.4453 0.0518 0.2199 
contractualtype 0.6516 0.0233 0.5938 0.0436 -1.1903 
publicpension 0.3532 0.0234 0.4609 0.0442 2.2049** 
privateinsurance 0.0382 0.0094 0.0625 0.0215 1.1748 
farmlandreadjustment 1.1504 0.0231 1.3359 0.0630 3.4120*** 
agriculturalincome 30.9451 1.6213 23.0859 2.5540 -2.4139** 
contracting 2.6062 0.0329 2.9141 0.0333 4.9335*** 
farmlandtitling 2.1098 0.0662 2.1719 0.1148 0.4582 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table C1 presents differences in the characteristics of treated group and controlled 
group with their t-stats before matching. The t-stats indicate that there are significant 
differences in publicpension, farmlandreadjustment, agriculturalincome and contracting. 
The differences in the mean characteristics between treated group (external individuals) and 
controlled group (internal individuals) indicated a potential source of bias, hence, the need 
for matching and selection bias tests. 
      In addition, Figure C1 gives the histogram of the estimated propensity scores for 
external individuals and internal individuals. The bottom half of the graph shows the 
propensity scores distribution for the internal individuals and the upper half refers to the 
external individuals. The densities of the scores are on the y-axis. So, Figure 4.5 shows that 
most of sample observations under the PSM are within the range of common values, only a 
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small number of samples lost, so this propensity score matching with nearest-neighbor is 
suitable. 
 
Figure C 1: Propensity Score Distribution 
 
The corresponding density diagram that is a fundamental data smoothing method to 
estimate the propensity score histogram distribution in Figure C1 between external 
individuals and internal individuals is reported in Figure C2. It illustrates that the difference 
in kernel density between treated group and controlled group after matching becomes much 
smaller than before matching. Before matching, there are significant differences in the 
characteristics between treated group and controlled group, so the propensity score curve of 
the treated departs from propensity score curve of the controlled. After matching, they are 
overlapping, which means that the differences in the characteristics between treated group 
and controlled group have been balanced. Because the basic idea of matching method is 
that in terms of the treated farmers who lease farmland to external individuals, I search for 
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some controlled farmers who lease farmland to internal individuals and have similar 
attributes with the treated to match with them. These two overlapping curves imply that the 
attributes between the treated and the controlled are similar. So, it means that the PSM 
satisfies the balancing requirement by kernel density test. 
 
Figure C 2: Density Distribution 
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Appendix C3 
Survey Summary 
These questions will be used for statistical purposes only. THIS INFORMATION WILL BE KEPT 
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL AND WILL BE DESTROYED UPON COMPLETION OF THE STUDY. 
 
1. Whether your family name is common in your village? (Circle one) 
1) seldom 2) not seldom but not common 3) common 
2. How many relatives and friends do you have in your village? (Circle one) 
1) none relative and friend 2) a few of relatives and friends 3) many relatives and friends 
3. Do you purchase governmental insurance? (Circle one) 
1) yes 2) no  
4. Do you purchase commercial insurance? (Circle one) 
1) yes 2) no  
5. Whether your farmland has been readjusted in 5 years? (Circle one) 
1) none of farmland has been readjusted in 5 years 2) part of farmland has been readjusted 
in 5 years 3) all farmland has been readjusted in 5 years 
6. Do you obtain farmland titling permit? (Circle one) 
1) titling on specific land area and share of land in rural land stock cooperative system 2) 
titling on specific land 3) titling on share of land in rural land stock cooperative system 4) 
under the process of titling 5) none 
 121 
 
7. Your agricultural income ratio ______________ 
8. Do you lease farmland by contract? (Circle one) 
1) by oral agreement 2) by paper contract not recognized by court 3) by formal contract 
recognized by court 
9. What kind of contract do you choose when leasing farmland? (Circle one) 
1) Fixed-Rent Contract 2) Sharing Contract 
10. Who leases your farmland? (Circle one) 
1) relatives, neighbors, farmers, farms, agricultural corporations and cooperatives in your 
village 2) farmers, farms, agricultural corporations and cooperatives outside your village 
 
Name_______________ ID number____________ telephone number___________ 
